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Abstract. In free speech theory ‘speech’ has to be defined as a special term of art. I argue 
that much free speech discourse comes with a tacit commitment to a ‘Subtractive Ap-
proach’ to defining speech. As an initial default, all communicative acts are assumed to 
qualify as speech, before exceptions are made to ‘subtract’ those acts that don’t warrant 
the special legal protections owed to ‘speech’. I examine how different versions of the 
Subtractive Approach operate, and criticise them in terms of their ability to yield a sub-
stantive definition of speech which covers all and only those forms of communicative ac-
tion that – so our arguments for free speech indicate – really do merit special legal protec-
tion. In exploring alternative definitional approaches, I argue that what ultimately com-
promises definitional adequacy in this arena is a theoretical commitment to the signifi-
cance of a single unified class of privileged communicative acts. I then propose an ap-
proach to free speech theory that eschews this theoretical commitment. 
 
1. Introduction: when is speech, ‘speech’? 
One of the basic tenets of liberalism is the idea that harmless conduct generally 
should not be subject to legal restriction. Liberal free speech principles go beyond 
this basic tenet. They demand that we accord a special status to ‘speech’, such 
that when it produces harm, it should be less liable to legal restriction than (sim-
ilarly harmful) non-‘speech’. Obviously, though, the million-dollar question is 
‘which communicative acts are appropriately classified as ‘speech’?’ And the an-
swer plainly can’t be ‘whatever we call ‘speech’ in ordinary discourse’, since many 
acts that involve ‘speech’ in the everyday sense of the word – like fraud, perjury, 
and extortion – fail to qualify as ‘speech’ under any plausible conception of free 
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speech. Within free speech theory, then, ‘speech’ needs to be defined as term of 
art. But if free speech principles are to have any credibility, this term of art can’t 
be an arbitrary contrivance; as Frederick Schauer says, it will need to be “defined 
by the purpose of a deep theory of freedom of speech”.1 In short, we require a def-
inition of ‘speech’ that picks out all – and only – those acts that really do merit 
special protection, in light of whatever cogent arguments for free speech we can 
find. This paper is a critical inquiry into the methodologies that are employed in 
attempts to formulate such a definition of ‘speech’. (Note that for the rest of this 
paper I’ll be using the term ‘SPEECH’ – thus stylized in small capitals – to denote 
the putative class of behaviors that merit special protection against legal re-
striction under liberal free speech principles.) 
Right from lesson one, students of free speech can see that SPEECH needs to be 
defined as a term of art. They see it in On Liberty, in Mill’s claim that a statement 
of the opinion that corn dealers are starvers of the poor “ought to be unmolested 
when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when 
delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn dealer.”2 
Students are reminded again that SPEECH is a term of art in Justice Holmes’s fa-
mous remark, in his opinion in Schenck v. United States, that even “the most stringent 
protection of free speech would not protect a man falsely shouting ‘fire’ in a the-
ater”.3 Both examples show that free speech principles don’t treat all ‘speech’ as 
‘SPEECH’, and that they are only meant to constrain restrictions on the latter. All 
this is fine as far as it goes. But these examples also subtly tie free speech discourse 
to a further theoretical commitment, one which is rarely made explicit, let alone 
critically examined. On Holmes’s view, shouting ‘fire’ shouldn’t qualify as 
SPEECH, because it creates an imminent danger that the government has a legiti-
mate interest in preventing. On Mill’s view, the statement that corn dealers are 
starvers of the poor – if it is addressed an agitated mob – shouldn’t qualify as 
SPEECH, because under these conditions this utterance constitutes a positive in-
stigation to violence, and therefore constitutes a type of ‘conduct’ rather than 
SPEECH. In both scenarios what’s suggested is not only that SPEECH is a special 
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term of art, but also that the way to map-out the boundaries of this term is via a 
method of subtraction. As a default supposition, we assume that all verbal commu-
nications count as SPEECH, but then we make reasoned exceptions to weed out 
the various types of communicative conduct which do not in fact warrant the spe-
cial protections accorded to SPEECH. 
Granted, calling this a ‘method’ is a little overblown, since this suggests the de-
liberate application of a codified technique for defining SPEECH, whereas what 
we see in practice – in jurisprudential scholarship, in political philosophy, and in 
the writings of judges and legislators – is generally more haphazard. Many con-
cerns and desiderata influence attempts to define SPEECH, and this results in can-
didate definitions that are often ad hoc, sometimes nakedly biased, and always 
contestable. Nevertheless, there is an underlying approach that’s frequently in ef-
fect in efforts to define SPEECH, one that’s prefigured in the examples that I’ve 
noted, and which all too often passes without scrutiny. We should seek to better 
understand this ‘Subtractive Approach’ to defining SPEECH, identify the form and 
complexion that it imparts to free speech theory, and think more about alterna-
tive definitional approaches and their comparative merits. 
My discussion is organized as follows. In §2 I lay out some of the key assumptions 
about free speech theory that I’ll be working with throughout. In §3 I briefly sum-
marize how SPEECH is defined in U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence. In §4 I 
discuss an important critique of the way that SPEECH is defined for the First 
Amendment, which focuses on the politicized dimensions of this process, and I 
connect this critique with issues of definitional methodology. In §5 I discuss an 
alternative – more systematic and criterial – Subtractive Approach to defining 
SPEECH, which can be viewed as an attempt to remedy certain shortcomings of 
the U.S. approach. In §6 I explain why this criterial method is of limited benefit, 
since its usage requires interpretative judgments that give ready expression to the 
presumptions and biases whose effect we need to try to curtail in defining 
SPEECH. In §7 I discuss the most promising version of the Subtractive Approach, 
and note that it also has significant limitations. I then identify two wrongheaded 
ideas about what disqualifies communication from the domain of SPEECH that 
seem to be in effect across different versions of the Subtractive Approach to de-
fining SPEECH. From this point onwards I consider theoretical alternatives to the 
Subtractive Approach. In §8 I explain why simply ‘adding’ things into the cate-
gory of SPEECH, as an alternative to ‘subtracting’ them out, doesn’t enable us to 
define SPEECH any better, unless we revise our conception of SPEECH so as to re-
ject the two wrongheaded ideas from §7. The first one, which I elaborate on in §9, 
is that SPEECH is somehow inert, or of its essential character unlike ‘real conduct’. 
The second one, which I discuss in §10, is that ‘SPEECH’ denotes a coherent and 
unified – rather than ad hoc and heterogenous – class of communicative behav-
iors. In §10 I present a sketch of a free speech theory that subdivides the category 
of SPEECH into several independent classes of protected communicative conduct, 
then does away with the umbrella category altogether. In §11 I explain why it isn’t 
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a problem that this kind of Subdividing Approach to free speech theory goes 
against free speech orthodoxy, by refusing to define SPEECH in a way that errs in 
favor of overprotection. In §12 I indicate some concerns, beyond bare theoretical 
curiosity, that motivate the development of this alternative Subdividing Ap-
proach to free speech. In §13 I sum up, then I defend the idealizing – which is to 
say, somewhat infeasible – nature of this kind of free speech theoretical frame-
work. 
2. The specialness of SPEECH, and the free speech ARGUMENTS 
As I say above, liberal free speech principles demand that SPEECH be treated as 
special, i.e. accorded protection against legal restriction that goes beyond liberal-
ism’s axiomatic injunction against the restriction of acts that don’t harm others.4 
Given the harm principle, we don’t need a separate free speech principle to artic-
ulate our opposition to the punishment of religious heresies, say, or the prohibi-
tion of ‘decadent’ art. Such things should be free from legal restriction simply be-
cause they are, in the relevant sense, harmless.5 In cases where support for ‘free 
speech’ is just opposition to these types of censorship, what’s being supported is 
really just the rudiments of liberalism. A distinct principle of free speech goes be-
yond this. It demands that, with regards to the state’s restriction of SPEECH that 
isn’t harmless – SPEECH that causes or constitutes (or runs the risk of doing) gen-
uine harm to others – a stricter justificatory standard for this restriction must be 
met, than in a case where equivalent harms stem from regular (i.e. non-SPEECH) 
action. A ‘free speech theory’, as I’ll be using that expression, is a theory that spec-
ifies what that higher standard of justification for restricting SPEECH should in-
volve, in principle and in practice, and which spells out the particular reasons 
why a higher standard of justification for restricting SPEECH is warranted, as op-
posed to just being something arbitrary or conventional.  
                                                     
4 On this characterization of SPEECH as special, see Frederick Schauer, “Must Speech be Special?” (1983) 
78:5 Nw UL Rev 1284; Douglas N Husak, “What is so Special about (Free) Speech?” (1985) 4:1 Law & Phil 
1. In what follows I say nothing about non-verbal communicative acts, like the wearing of a black arm-
band, being counted as SPEECH. I assume the standard view, that some such communicative acts can be 
categorized as SPEECH because they’re communicative in a way that’s relevantly similar to paradigmatic 
forms of SPEECH; see Paul Berckmans, “The Semantics of Symbolic Speech” (1997) 16:2 Law & Phil 145. In 
any case, this point has little bearing on an assessment of the Subtractive Approach and how it compares 
to other definitional methods. No method for defining SPEECH should categorize non-verbal communica-
tion as SPEECH by default, and any method can widen the borders of SPEECH to include some instances of 
non-verbal communication.  
5 The relevant notion of harmlessness here is one that’s correlative to a particular technical sense of ‘harm’, 
on which a harm is something like a rights-violating setback to an individual’s interests; see for instance 
Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, vol 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1985). 
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Free speech theory, thus characterized, is an enterprise that only makes sense 
against the backdrop of liberalism, or a political philosophy that shares liberal-
ism’s relevant elements, i.e. its prioritization of the individual’s liberty-protecting 
schedule of rights, and its corresponding commitment to the harm principle as a 
constraint on legitimate government action.6 There may be a story to tell about 
what free speech looks like in a Marxist, Anarcho-syndicalist, Theocratic, or 
Communitarian Christian society, but ‘free speech theory’ here (and customarily) 
isn’t that. There may also be a story to tell about free speech as a part of some 
substantial conception of human flourishing. If a person’s views about the good 
life are all linked to open-minded inquiry and discussion then, for her, ‘free 
speech’ won’t merely be about the side-constraints limiting legitimate govern-
ment action, it will also be an affirmative ideal that influences her relationships, 
her vocation, and other major elements of her life. But free speech theory here (and 
customarily) isn’t about all that; it’s about a formal constraint that government 
must respect in order for it to be justified in restricting people’s conduct, whether 
through the law or more directly. 
If it is a mistake to regard SPEECH as special – if there are no good reasons to spe-
cially protect an elected class of communications, in a way that goes beyond lib-
eralism’s elementary injunction against restricting harmless acts – then the role 
of free speech ideals and principles in policy-making is (or should be) minimal.7 
To reach this conclusion is not to abandon liberalism wholesale. After all, there 
are at least some mature liberal democracies which, while nominally subscribing 
to free speech ideals, don’t accord SPEECH any categorical privileges in their pol-
icy-making calculus. Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, for 
instance, there isn’t any rigid injunction against restricting ‘expression’. Such re-
strictions are permitted, under the Charter, provided that they are (in the relevant 
sense) ‘reasonable’ and ‘justified’.8 One result of this is that censorship disputes 
in Canada don’t hinge on what gets categorized as ‘expression’. This is why L. W. 
Sumner, in his analysis of anti-hate speech law in Canada, is willing to count any 
                                                     
6 Here and below I stress that liberalism begins with the harm principle, and that free speech principles 
don’t do any distinctive work unless they operate against the backdrop of the harm principle. But this 
isn’t meant to suggest that in the U.S. or any other liberal democracy the harm principle is enacted with 
anything like full consistency; after all, most liberal states prohibit harmless acts, e.g., related to public 
nudity. (Thanks to Martha Nussbaum for pressing me on this.) My point is that where there isn’t even 
any notional allegiance to the harm principle – e.g., where heterodox ideas are routinely suppressed, with-
out even any pretense that this is done for the sake of preventing harm to others – it’s inapt to speak of 
violations of free speech. Free speech principles, properly characterized, are not merely one ramification 
of the harm principle, they are an independent supplement to it. 
7 See Lawrence Alexander & Paul Horton, “The Impossibility of a Free Speech Principle” (1984) 78:5 Nw 
UL Rev 1319. 
8 See §§1–2 of The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, being schedule B 
to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c11. 
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act with any expressive intent at all, even terror-bombing, as ‘expression’.9 If the 
question that guides policy-making is whether α’s restriction is favored by a con-
sequentialist calculus that encompasses all relevant values, it makes little differ-
ence to policy whether or not α is counted as ‘expression’ (or SPEECH). Things 
operate differently when we treat SPEECH as special, and in so doing demand that 
a stricter standard than mere ‘reasonableness’ or ‘routine harm-prevention’ be 
met in putative justifications for legally restricting SPEECH. At the same time, this 
doesn’t mean that where SPEECH is accorded special privileges, policy is entirely 
decided by what gets classified as SPEECH. Where SPEECH is accorded a special 
status, to classify α as SPEECH isn’t to disallow restrictions on α regardless of α’s 
harmfulness.10 Or in other words, not all conduct that is ‘covered’ by free speech 
principles is ultimately ‘protected’ against restriction.11 What’s more, the free 
speech tradition also contains a principle – namely, a general prohibition on gov-
ernment restricting any sort of conduct as a way of suppressing disapproved ideas 
– that can apply more or less independently of judgments about free speech cov-
erage.12 The point here is that giving a specially privileged status to SPEECH, as in 
the U.S., does have a considerable effect on censorship policy. Consequently, if 
we want to not downgrade the role free speech principles play in shaping policy, 
debates around free speech coverage cannot be ignored.  
The question remains, as to why SPEECH should be deemed special. And in the free 
speech tradition – in political theory, philosophy, jurisprudence, and in First 
Amendment theory – we find an oversupply of potential answers. Moreover, in 
addition to many different attempts to answer the first-order question, i.e. ‘why 
should we specially privilege SPEECH’, the literature also contains plenty of sec-
ond-order analyses that try to summarize and systematize responses to the first-
order question.13 Now, the present work is about how SPEECH is defined in free 
speech, as distinct from what justifies free speech. The two things are related, but 
it’s hard to say anything of substance about the justificatory questions without 
                                                     
9 LW Sumner, The Hateful and the Obscene: Studies in the Limits of Free Expression (Toronto: University of To-
ronto Press, 2004) at 10. 
10 At any rate, this is how we should understand the specialness of SPEECH in a legal system that purports 
to impose categorical constraints on government regulation of communicative action. Certain recent U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions cast doubt on whether this is the operative understanding of SPEECH’s special-
ness under current First Amendment doctrine. For example, in Snyder v Phelps 562 US 443 (2011), the court 
appears to rule that it would be unconstitutional to restrict members of the Westboro Baptist Church 
from picketing soldiers’ funerals irrespective of the pain that that activity causes to others; see Frederick 
Schauer, “Harm(s) and the First Amendment” (2011) 2011:1. Sup Ct Rev 81 at 87-90. 
11 For instance, we might classify libel as SPEECH while at the same time regarding the harms caused or 
threatened by libeling SPEECH as sufficient, at least in principle, to justify its legal restriction; see Schauer, 
supra note 1 at 89-92. 
12 Thanks to David Strauss for pressing me on this point. 
13 See Schauer, supra note 1; Joshua Cohen, “Freedom of Expression” (1993) 22:3 Philosophy & Public Af-
fairs 207. 
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this becoming one’s focus. This is why the following paragraph contains mostly 
assertions, rather than arguments. 
There are four types of free speech justifications that are credible enough to merit 
serious attention. There is also a crucial ‘meta-justification’ that is connected 
with each of the four. The first kind of free speech argument is Epistemic. Roughly, 
it says certain communication types – relating to inquiry, research, and reportage 
– must be specially protected, as SPEECH, since failing to do so will impair social 
epistemic goods.14 The second kind of argument is Democratic. It says that certain 
communication types – relating to political advocacy, protest, and dissent – must 
be specially protected, as SPEECH, because failing to do so will undermine the le-
gitimacy and/or the effectiveness of democratic politics.15 The third kind of argu-
ment is Expressive. It says certain kinds of communications – e.g., relating to liter-
ature and the arts – need to be specially protected, as SPEECH, since failing to do 
so jeopardizes goods related to human creativity, authentic cultural expression, 
and aesthetic pleasure.16 The fourth kind of argument pertains to Worldview. It says 
certain communications – relating to proselytism, ethical advocacy, and religious 
texts – must be specially protected, as SPEECH, in view of the need for all people 
to be able to give authentic expression to their ethical or spiritual belief-systems.17 
Each argument adverts to a particular aspect of human society, and each trains 
our focus on some specific types of communicative acts that it nominates for spe-
cial legal protections. The meta-justification linking them all is one that alleges 
the incompetence or mendacity of Government. This argument is built around Lib-
ertarian concerns about government tyranny, of the kind that tend to recommend 
robust constraints on all government intervention in people’s affairs, regardless 
of whether these aim at the restriction of communicative activity as such. In free 
speech theorizing, however, these Libertarian worries combine with the other 
types of arguments sketched above. So, for instance, it is the combination of (i) 
the fragility of certain social epistemic goods, and (ii) the mendacity and/or in-
                                                     
14 See, most famously, Mill, supra note 2. 
15 See Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1948); or in late 20th century legal philosophy, Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1985). 
16 See, for instance, C Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1989); JM Coetzee, Giving Offense: Essays on Censorship (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
17 See, for instance, Joseph Raz, “Free Expression and Personal Identification” in Ethics in the Public Domain 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 131. 
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competence of government, that explains why social epistemic goods will be par-
ticularly imperiled without special protection for communicative conduct relat-
ing to research and reportage.18, 19 
How does all this link up with our methods for defining SPEECH? As I say in §1, a 
sound free speech theory will supply us with a definition of SPEECH which iden-
tifies all and only those communicative activities that really do merit ‘special’ pro-
tection, in the sense I have previously indicated. The arguments briefly sketched 
above, which are of course mapped-out in great detail in the literature, can inform 
us as to which kinds of communicative acts require such protection, and why. 
Henceforth I’ll refer to these as ‘the ARGUMENTS’. A successful definition of 
SPEECH won’t simply piggy-back on our everyday usage of the term ‘speech’, or 
arbitrarily designate a class of communications with no evident relation to the 
ARGUMENTS. Instead, it will identify and specify unifying characteristics of the 
communication types which are indicated or nominated, by the ARGUMENTS, as 
being in need of special protection. When a definition of SPEECH satisfies this 
condition, I’ll say that it ‘answers to the ARGUMENTS’. An assessment of the Sub-
tractive Approach to defining SPEECH is, first and foremost, an investigation into 
whether this method can yield a definition of SPEECH that satisfactorily answers 
to the ARGUMENTS.20 
                                                     
18 Arguments from Government figure notably in Schauer’s early free speech writing, especially supra note 
1, and free speech theory regularly returns to them, especially in the work of American First Amendment 
scholars who find more utopian perspectives on free speech – as a royal road to truth or democracy – a 
bit too rose-colored; as in, for instance, Vincent Blasi, “The Pathological Perspective and the First Amend-
ment” (1985) 85:3 4 Colum L Rev 449. 
19 An argument that I’m ignoring in this section – one that’s notable, but ultimately idiosyncratic – is the 
argument from tolerance, on which the reason for specially protecting SPEECH is that the state can 
thereby signal a tolerant ethos and thus help nurture tolerant sensibilities in society at large; see Lee C 
Bollinger, The Tolerant Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). Another kind of argument I’m ig-
noring is the kind that stresses people’s agency or autonomy as the key thing that’s honored or promoted 
in a regime of communicative liberty; for a recent example see Seana Valentine Shiffrin, “A Thinker-based 
Approach to Freedom of Speech” (2011) 27:2 Const Commentary 283. Arguments of this latter kind have 
been roundly criticized; see, e.g., Susan J Brison, “The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech” (1998) 108:2 
Ethics 312. I’m ignoring them not for that reason, but just because I think they advert to values that are 
accounted for in the other free speech arguments noted above. 
20 In thinking critically about our methods for defining SPEECH, in accordance with the approach that I’ve 
outlined here, the wider theoretical aim is not merely to say what the operative conception of SPEECH in 
free speech theory and practice is, as a matter of contingent sociological fact, but rather to say what con-
ception of SPEECH ultimately should be at work in free speech theory. In her influential work in social 
theory Haslanger calls this mode of inquiry into a contested concept an ‘ameliorative inquiry’; see, e.g., 
Sally Haslanger, “Gender and Race: (What) are They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be?” (2000) 34:1 
Noûs 31. For a detailed defense of the view that ameliorative inquiries are a legitimate part of conceptual 
analysis in law and legal theory, see, e.g., Natalie Stoljar, “What Do We Want Law to Be? Philosophical 
Analysis and the Concept of Law” in Wil Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa, eds, Philosophical Foundations of the 
Nature of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 230. 
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3. Defining SPEECH in the First Amendment 
Although our subject is free speech per se, rather than the institutionalized form 
of free speech we find in U.S. constitutional law, it still behooves us to pay atten-
tion to the First Amendment, not just because it’s the most comprehensive juris-
prudential system of free speech principles, but also because it’s a legal frame-
work which, to a greater degree than any other, purports to make good on the 
basic idea that SPEECH should be specially privileged. Whole books could be 
written on how SPEECH is defined within the First Amendment, so my discussion 
here will be cursory. What I’m trying to do is (i) motivate a particular critique of 
how SPEECH is defined for First Amendment purposes, and (ii) show how one of 
the assumptions of the Subtractive Approach is sometimes at work in the circum-
scription of SPEECH for First Amendment purposes. 
One significant area of First Amendment doctrine, vis-à-vis the boundaries of 
SPEECH, relates to so-called ‘fighting words’. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942), 
the Supreme Court upheld a New Hampshire statute under which Walter Chap-
linsky had been convicted for calling a police officer a ‘damned Fascist’ and 
‘damned racketeer’. Justice Murphy’s opinion, affirming the statute’s constitu-
tionality, identified fighting words as a type of communication that’s outside the 
protected realm of SPEECH. “There are certain well defined and narrowly limited 
classes of speech” he said, whose restriction has “never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem.” 
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insult-
ing or “fighting” words – those which, by their very utterance, inflict injury or 
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace… such utterances are no es-
sential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a 
step to truth that any benefit… from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality.21 
The chief consideration cited here to explain why fighting words don’t count as 
SPEECH is (i) that they make a negligible contribution to social epistemic goods. 
Three further features of fighting words are mentioned, which can also be read as 
a part of the court’s reasons for subtracting them from the domain of SPEECH: (ii) 
that fighting words injure by their very utterance, (iii) that they incite immediate 
disorder, and (iv) that the courts have never counted them as SPEECH. Now, at 
least some of these sound like pro tanto good reasons to place fighting words out-
side the domain of SPEECH. But at the same time, this reasoning looks like an im-
provised response to the issues created by fighting words policy, rather than an 
application of a general principle for classifying SPEECH, which has been settled 
in advance and disinterestedly applied to the case. We aren’t told whether any of 
criteria (i)-(iv) are sufficient to disqualify speech as SPEECH, or whether all four 
                                                     
21 315 US 568(1942). 
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are required, nor are we told about their relative priority, nor whether there are 
other conditions that disqualify communications as SPEECH, but which happen 
not to be salient vis-à-vis fighting words. Chaplinsky doesn’t address these ques-
tions because it isn’t founded upon a deeper theory that answers them. This lack 
of a settled theory of the boundaries of SPEECH is evident again in subsequent 
decisions around fighting words. Cohen v. California (1971),22 for instance, rules that 
utterances, in order to be subtracted from SPEECH as fighting words, need to ex-
press not just general hostile sentiments, but “personally abusive epithets”; thus 
extending protection to the message on Cohen’s jacket (‘fuck the draft’), for 
which he had previously been convicted under the California penal code. Are such 
doctrinal tweaks pure ad-hoccery? Not necessarily. In this policy area, as in other 
areas of constitutional jurisprudence, the Court is attempting to discern the 
proper purposes of the First Amendment, and to ensure that protections are only 
extended to communicative conduct in a way that’s justified in view of those pur-
poses.23 What this generates, though, are ways of thinking about the boundaries 
of SPEECH that are relevant to a specific policy issue, rather than generalizable 
criteria which demarcate the boundaries of SPEECH.  
Fighting words doctrine largely belongs to the First Amendment’s past.24 Ques-
tions about the status of corporate electioneering communication, by contrast, 
belong to its present, and a similar set of issues arises in this arena. In Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Committee (2010),25 the Court’s ruling – contrary to sec-
tions of the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA),26 and to earlier Court 
decisions, including Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990)27 – was that ‘in-
dependent’ expenditures by corporations, advocating the election or defeat of a 
candidate, do count as SPEECH, and should be protected from legal restriction ac-
cordingly.28 Citizens United thus overrules prior judgments, by the courts and the 
federal legislature, which had subtracted such corporate electioneering from the 
                                                     
22 403 US 15 (1971). 
23 Outside the framework of legal institutions, some purely political-theoretical inquiries into what 
should be counted as SPEECH work at this same intersection, between the underlying normative aims of 
free speech principles and the social issues raised by a particular type of communicative conduct. One 
recent example of this, which examines whether hate speech should qualify as SPEECH, is in Caleb Yong, 
“Does Freedom of Speech Include Hate Speech?” (2011) 17:4 Res Publica 385. 
24 The Court has narrowed its definition of fighting words each time it has applied it, and hence Chaplin-
sky himself, as Lawrence wryly notes, is “the only defendant… ever found to have used fighting words”; 
see Frederick M Lawrence, “Violence-conducive Speech: Punishable Verbal Assault or Protected Political 
Speech?” in David Kretzmer & Francine Kershman Hazan, eds, Freedom of Speech and Incitement Against De-
mocracy (London: Kluwer Law International, 2000) 11 at 28. 
25 8–205, 558 US 310 (2010). 
26 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub L No 107–155, 116 Stat 81. 
27 494 US 652 (1990). 
28 By ‘protected’, here, I mean ‘subject to strict scrutiny in the process of judicial review’. 
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protected domain of SPEECH. In Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the (5-4) majority, 
this reclassification of corporate electioneering as SPEECH was defended via crit-
icism of the validity of the reasons for which it had previously been subtracted. 
Corporate electioneering may have a distorting impact upon our public debates 
surrounding electoral politics, and it’s fairly probable that allowing corporations 
to engage in electioneering communication on similar terms to labor unions will 
enable corporate interests to exert greater influence than organized labor on elec-
tion outcomes. But corporate electioneering is political speech despite these 
things, so Kennedy argues, and the BCRA 2002 and Austin were mistaken to re-
gard the above considerations as reasons to subtract it from the domain of 
SPEECH. As with fighting words doctrine, the reasoning that guides this classifi-
catory judgment is related to the specific policy questions at issue, and therefore 
we aren’t being presented with any fully generalized theory of what the First 
Amendment covers. But, as in the previous case, it would be wrong to deride the 
reasoning as pure ad hocery, even if we’re dubious about its substance.29 The court 
is purporting to honor the First Amendment’s aims, and – in a way that’s com-
patible with inherited doctrinal understandings of how those aims then translate 
into specific constraints upon government action – ensure that the forms of cor-
porate electioneering which are encompassed within the First Amendment’s aims 
receive the protections that they’re entitled to. 
Other areas of First Amendment doctrine could be examined to shed more light 
on our picture of the process by which SPEECH is defined under U.S. constitu-
tional law, but these two examples will suffice for present purposes. These exam-
ples indicate two things. First, the Court’s increasing reluctance, over time, to 
allow for new subtractions, or even just to maintain previous subtractions, of par-
ticular sub-categories of communicative conduct from the privileged domain of 
SPEECH.30 In the present U.S. lawmaking environment, the onus of justification 
falls on those who think that a particular type of communication ought to be sub-
tracted from the privileged domain of SPEECH, and thus placed outside the nor-
mative arena governed by First Amendment doctrine. What’s more, even with a 
category of communication like ‘obscenity’, i.e. one whose subtraction from the 
domain of SPEECH has been a longstanding element of First Amendment doctrine, 
judicial interpretations of where SPEECH ends and obscenity begins have some-
times bestowed First Amendment protections on communicative acts that would 
                                                     
29 For critiques of the substance of the majority reasoning in Citizens United, supra note 25, see, e.g., Law-
rence Lessig, “A Reply to Professor Hasen” (2012) 126 Harv L Rev F 61; Steven J Heyman, “The Conserva-
tive-Libertarian Turn in First Amendment Jurisprudence” (2014) 117:1 W Va L Rev 231. 
30 As one popular First Amendment casebook observes, “the court has not upheld a restriction on speech 
because it might induce readers or listeners to engage in criminal activity since Dennis (1951)… The Court 
has not upheld a restriction on speech because it might provoke a hostile audience response since Feiner 
(1951). It has never upheld a restriction on speech because the ideas expressed might have an improper 
influence on the judicial process”; Geoffrey R Stone, Louis M Seidman, Cass R Sunstein, Mark V Tushnet 
& Pamela S Karlan, The First Amendment, 4th ed (New York: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2012) at 125. 
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have otherwise been unprotected.31 It isn’t a matter of historical necessity that 
things should work like this. Instead of a general presumption that communica-
tive acts qualify as SPEECH, unless or until an analysis of the aims of the First 
Amendment forces us to conclude otherwise, it’s at least possible that an alterna-
tive classificatory system could have evolved, under which all types of acts are 
located outside the technically-specified domain of SPEECH, until an analysis of 
First Amendment aims forces us to include them. In any case, the onus for now 
runs the opposite way.32 
The second thing these examples indicate is that judgments about when First 
Amendment doctrine should apply are not typically determined by an appeal to 
some prior, independent, and settled characterization of SPEECH. Indeed, some-
thing like the reverse is closer to the mark: what gets characterized as SPEECH is 
typically determined by judgments about when First Amendment doctrine 
should apply. And these judgments, about when the First Amendment is in play, 
tend to be issue-specific, since they partly hinge on narrow, imminent, practical 
questions (e.g., ‘what problems does this statute aim to address?’), and not just 
the larger normative and interpretative questions about the First Amendment’s 
purposes. For each type of communicative act at issue, courts have to consider 
the social impact of these acts, and the reasons why they’re performed, and deter-
mine whether there is a good case for prohibition or regulation, but also whether 
this is overridden by some loftier reason to protect the communicative activity in 
question, related to the purposes the First Amendment is meant to serve. Justice 
John Paul Stevens spoke to this complexity in discussing the constitutional sta-
tus of anti-hate speech laws. “Whether a particular act or message is more appro-
                                                     
31 Obscenity is a rather complex case, though. The standard of obscenity outlined in Roth v United States, 
354 US 476 (1957) was altered sixteen years later in Miller v California, 413 US 15 (1973), such that, in order 
to be prohibited, a work only needed to be found to lack ‘serious’ value, rather than it having to be found 
to be ‘utterly without socially redeeming value’. Miller thus extended the compass of ‘obscenity’, and 
thereby – against the overriding trend in First Amendment coverage through this era – subtracted some 
communicative acts from the protected domain of SPEECH. But in between Roth and Miller, Stanley v Geor-
gia, 394 US 557 (1969) included a clarifying ruling to the effect that the First Amendment disallows any 
prohibition on the mere private (i.e. non-commercial) possession and consumption of obscene material. 
In that ruling, Stanley effectively narrowed the range of communications held outside the domain of First 
Amendment protection via the excepted category of obscenity.  
32 The brevity of my discussion here makes it difficult to avoid some oversimplification. As Schauer has 
recently reemphasized, there are some kinds of communicative behaviors (like perjury) for which there’s 
never been any onus on anyone to justify their exclusion from SPEECH – which are, rather, simply univer-
sally accepted as being outside the domain of SPEECH, despite the fact that they obviously involve ‘speech’ 
in the everyday sense of the word; see Frederick Schauer, “Out of Range: On Patently Uncovered Speech” 
(2015) 128 Harv L Rev F 346. (Thanks to Andy Koppelman for pressing me on this.) To be clear, then, my 
remarks above primarily apply to types of communication whose status as SPEECH or non-SPEECH has 
been a matter of live controversy. I should also note that when it comes to questions of coverage, the 
historical evolution of First Amendment doctrine has been considerably less tidy than what’s suggested 
in the broad-strokes picture that I’ve been painting. Lakier convincingly argues that things like libel and 
commercial advertising have had a volatile and unsettled trajectory – vis-à-vis their status as SPEECH or 
non-SPEECH – more so than is usually acknowledged in contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence; 
see Genevieve Lakier, “The Invention of Low-value Speech” (2015) 128:8 Harv L Rev 2166. 
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priately deemed ‘speech’ or ‘conduct’” he says, “turns on context as well as con-
tent… a cross-burning as part of a public rally in a stadium may fairly be described 
as protected speech, [but] burning the same cross on the front lawn of an un-
friendly neighbor has an entirely different character”.33 My point is that rulings 
which serve to demarcate the boundaries of SPEECH for First Amendment pur-
poses are enacted amid the hurly-burly of these pragmatic-interpretative chal-
lenges. What we patently don’t see, is a systematic method for distinguishing 
SPEECH from non-SPEECH, which can be used procedurally to decide when the 
First Amendment apparatus should be used to assess the regulation of a particu-
lar type of communication.  
4. The politics of defining SPEECH 
How SPEECH is defined for First Amendment purposes is a politically controver-
sial matter to say the least. Some critics argue that SPEECH gets defined in a way 
that unjustifiably privileges the communicative aims of entrenched ideological 
interests. Part of this complaint is that both sides of politics use free speech rhet-
oric to shield their favored communications from legal challenge, while also con-
testing each other’s rhetorical maneuvers to the same effect.34 But the deeper 
worry is that SPEECH is – can only ever be – a makeshift category, and that what 
gets put into it, and thus specially protected, isn’t a matter of principle, but just a 
result of some faction having the savvy to commandeer the First Amendment to 
further its own aims. As Stanley Fish says: 
Decisions about what is and what is not protected in the realm of expression 
will rest not on principle or firm doctrine but on the ability of some persons 
to interpret… doctrine in ways that lead to the protection of speech they want 
heard and the regulation of speech they want silenced… When the First 
Amendment is successfully invoked, the result is not a victory for free speech 
in the face of… politics, but a political victory won by the party that has managed 
to wrap its agenda in the mantle of free speech.35  
Schauer has written on the same theme, though in a less iconoclastic mood than 
Fish.36 It isn’t formal legal precepts or abstruse free speech theory, he says, that 
                                                     
33 John Paul Stevens, “The Freedom of Speech” (1993) 102:6 Yale LJ 1293 at 1310-11. 
34 See Nat Hentoff, Free Speech for Me But Not for Thee: How the American Left and Right Relentlessly Censor Each 
Other (New York: HarperCollins, 1992). 
35 Stanley Fish, There’s No Such Thing as Free Speech, and it’s a Good Thing Too (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994) at 110. 
36 See Frederick Schauer, “The Ontology of Censorship” in Robert C Post, ed, Censorship and Silencing: Prac-
tices of Cultural Regulation (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute for the History of Art and the Humanities, 
1998) 147; “The Boundaries of the First Amendment: a Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience” 
(2004) 117:6 Harv L Rev 1765. 
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determine why some issues are regarded as hinging on First Amendment doc-
trine, while others are handled in a way that sets First Amendment doctrine aside. 
The question of which acts are such that their restriction is a First Amendment 
issue is influenced, and often decided, by cultural and economic factors, which 
are of course highly politicized, and can easily become battlegrounds in culture 
wars. 
This worry isn’t merely academic. When legislation aimed at remedying the sex-
ist effects of pornography, and campus speech codes aimed at protecting students 
from racist harassment, are deemed unconstitutional on First Amendment 
grounds, the characterization of these policies as First Amendment issues is not 
the upshot of a disinterested classificatory process, but rather a consequence of 
an unacknowledged ideological creed: that the liberties of sexists and racists mat-
ter more than the equality of women and minorities. At any rate, so feminist crit-
ics37 and critical race theorists38 have argued. And even if one isn’t fully persuaded 
that the issues are ideologically rigged in the way these critics say, one can agree 
with the critics this far: that free speech principles don’t merit any support unless 
they really are principles, as opposed to the hollow rhetorical devices that Fish be-
moans. Theorists of a Foucauldian bent, for whom liberal ideals ultimately con-
ceal structural oppression, will see little promise in trying to do anything with 
‘free speech’ beyond unmasking the hidden currents of power it legitimizes.39 But 
there is another way forward, if we’re worried about a potentially malign politics 
of free speech, and how definitions of SPEECH are involved in this, which is to try 
to recover liberalism’s egalitarian and emancipatory aims, and refashion liberal 
principles in their service.40 Indeed, Fish points the way. In the politics of free 
speech, he says “it is not that there are no choices to make or means of making 
them”, rather, it’s that these choices “are inextricable from the din and confusion 
of partisan struggle”.41 Our aim shouldn’t be to define SPEECH in a way that’s neu-
tral and apolitical, but to define it in a way that answers to the ideals that free 
                                                     
37 See Andrea Dworkin & Catharine A MacKinnon, Pornography and Civil Rights: A New Day for Women’s Equal-
ity (Minneapolis: Organizing against Pornography, 1988). 
38 Richard Delgado, “Words that Wound: a Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-calling” 
(1982) 17:1 Harv CR-CLL Rev 133. 
39 Butler is one prominent contemporary figure who leans this way; see Judith Butler, “Ruled Out: Vocab-
ularies of the Censor” in Robert C Post, ed, Censorship and Silencing: Practices of Cultural Regulation (Los An-
geles: Getty Research Institute for the History of Art and the Humanities, 1998) 247. 
40 There is some reason to think this perspective would have the support of some influential contempo-
rary political philosophers who write on structural racial oppression. For instance, Mills’s work on radi-
cal black liberalism explicitly calls for the recovery of liberal ideals in the name of a radical egalitarian 
politics; see Charles W Mills, “Occupy Liberalism! Or, Ten Reasons Why Liberalism Cannot be Retrieved 
for Radicalism (And Why They’re All Wrong)” (2012) 15:2 Radical Philosophy Review 305. 
41 Fish, supra note 35 at 115. 
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speech politics in its classical, Millian guise – siding with the marginalized against 
the powerful – was supposed to serve.42 
So what exactly would this lead us towards, methodologically? Here’s a prima facie 
promising option: we need a method for defining SPEECH in which the crucial 
distinctions are made outside of the tumultuous intersection of policy-making 
and constitutional interpretation, so that they can be more firmly rooted in a clear 
and faithful conception of free speech’s political aims, than is possible in that cha-
otic arena. SPEECH has to be defined by the purpose of a theory of freedom of 
speech, but this means defining it using abstract, generalizable criteria, which can 
differentiate the communicative acts that really do require special protection 
against legal restriction from the ones that don’t. In §§5–6 I’ll examine Kent 
Greenawalt’s attempt, in Speech Crime and the Uses of Language,43 to develop this sort 
of systematized, subtractive method for categorizing SPEECH, and I’ll also look at 
Ishani Maitra and Mary Kate McGowan’s structurally similar proposal, from two 
more recent papers,44 which they use to argue that (some) hate speech and por-
nography shouldn’t be counted as SPEECH. An understanding of how SPEECH is 
defined within the First Amendment (§3), and of the political issues around this 
(§4), helps us see what’s appealing about these accounts, but also why they ulti-
mately can’t take us very far.  
5. A systematic subtractive method for defining SPEECH  
Greenawalt starts with an initial working supposition, that all ‘oral and written 
communication’ and ‘nonverbal artistic endeavors’ qualify as SPEECH. But soon 
thereafter he notes the obvious problem, that “some ordinary communications are 
reached barely, if at all, by the justifications for free speech”.45 The question is 
how to identify these acts, without relying on erratic intuitions about ‘the point’ 
of this type of utterance or that type of writing. Greenawalt’s proposal is to sub-
tract, from the domain of SPEECH, ‘situation-altering’ acts, i.e. acts which “change 
the social world in which we live”, by “shifting rights or obligations or both”.46 
Consider the example of a statement that constitutes a promise. When person A 
says ‘I promise to φ’, she doesn’t report a preexisting fact about her being obliged 
to φ; rather, A’s utterance generates an obligation for her to φ, thus altering the 
                                                     
42 On this point see Andrew Koppelman, “Veil of Ignorance: Tunnel Constructivism in Free Speech The-
ory” (2013) 107:2 Nw UL Rev 647. 
43 Kent Greenawalt, Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
44 Ishani Maitra & Mary Kate McGowan, “The Limits of Free Speech: Pornography and the Question of 
Coverage” (2007) 13:1 Leg Theory 41; “On Racist Hate Speech and the Scope of a Free Speech Principle” 
(2010) 23:2 Can JL & Jur 343. 
45 Greenawalt, supra note 43 at 41. 
46 Ibid at 58-59. 
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social world that she and others inhabit. This is the sense in which “I promise to 
φ” qualifies as a situation-altering utterance under Greenawalt’s account. More 
specifically, Greenawalt wants to subtract from SPEECH utterances that are situ-
ation-altering both ‘substantially’ (i.e. they effect substantial rather than negligi-
ble changes in duties or rights) and ‘dominantly’ (i.e. an alteration of the situation 
is the act’s primary aim or effect). 
The key to making sense of this terminology is to think of Greenawalt as attempt-
ing to reinstate an intuitive distinction between (i) words being used merely to 
say things, and (ii) words being used to do things. I say ‘reinstate’, because the 
viability of any such distinction has been dubious ever since the emergence of 
speech-act-theoretic work in linguistic pragmatics, popularized by midcentury 
philosophers like Austin, Strawson, and Searle.47 The enduring insight of these 
early speech act analyses of language is that linguistic acts (whether written or 
spoken) cannot be divided into two discrete, non-overlapping classes of sayings 
and doings. Rather, all communicative, linguistic acts are both sayings and do-
ings.48 Or to use the jargon: all speech has a ‘locutionary’ aspect, i.e. it conveys 
certain content, and an ‘illocutionary’ aspect, i.e. its performance constitutes an 
act of some kind, whether it’s a representative (‘α is the case’), an expressive (‘I’m 
sorry about α’), a declarative (‘I pronounce thee α’), a directive (‘you, φ, now!’), 
or a commissive (‘I promise to φ’).49 Greenawalt recognizes that speech-act anal-
yses undermine a SPEECH v. conduct binary. Nonetheless, he thinks there is a nor-
matively significant distinction in the offing, that tracks this (once-) commonsen-
sical binary, and which free speech principles are meant to latch onto. There is, 
he thinks, a primary purpose that can be ascribed to communicative acts: some of 
them aim primarily to convey ideas, opinions, information, claims, and putative 
facts, while others aim primarily to effect changes in our social relations. The for-
mer is what free speech principles are meant to protect, he maintains, and the 
criterion of being ‘dominantly and substantially situation-altering’ is meant to 
identify the latter, so as to exclude them from the protected domain of SPEECH. 
What this gives us, in theory, is a principled explanation of why communicative 
                                                     
47 JL Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962); PF Strawson, “In-
tention and Convention in Speech Acts” (1964) 73:4 The Philosophical Review 439; John R Searle, Speech 
Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969). 
48 This will come as a surprise to those who read the initial, conjectural ‘performative’ versus ‘constative’ 
distinction in the early chapters of Austin, supra note 47, as the author’s actual position, ignoring the tri-
partite taxonomy he develops in the later chapters, after having spelled out the various inadequacies of 
the performative versus constative distinction. 
49 Different theorists propose different taxonomical sub-classes of illocutionary action; these ones are 
from Searle; see John R Searle, “A Classification of Illocutionary Acts” (1976) 5:1 Language in Society 1. 
The other dimension of speech acts, which I’ve set aside here, is the ‘perlocutionary’. Words – as well as 
conveying content, and constituting acts by their very utterance – also produce effects. “Careful; it’s rain-
ing outside” conveys the locutionary content that it’s raining, and has the illocutionary force of a warning, 
but it also has the perlocutionary effect of, say, persuading someone to grab an umbrella. The perlocu-
tionary act of persuasion isn’t constituted by the utterance of the words (as an illocutionary act is), but 
rather effected by the utterance. 
17 
 
act types such as agreements, promises, threats, and orders aren’t all covered by 
free speech. And the account is then supposed to enable us to extrapolate beyond 
these cases, which are already widely reflected in law, so that judgments about 
whether (e.g.) fighting words or corporate electioneering qualify as SPEECH can 
be made by us asking whether acts of these kinds are dominantly and substan-
tially situation-altering. 
Maitra’s and McGowan’s account is inspired by Greenawalt’s, and the core idea 
is much the same: some communicative acts are more like doings than sayings, 
and we can differentiate these from SPEECH-proper by identifying their defining 
criteria qua doings. Greenawalt’s talk of ‘situation-altering’ utterances is replaced 
with talk of ‘obligation-enacting’ utterances in their account, primarily because 
the latter term singles-out the type of changes to social relations that matter most, 
namely, ones in which people’s obligations are altered. The other, more im-
portant, difference between the two accounts is that Maitra and McGowan don’t 
regard dominance, in Greenawalt’s sense, as having a proper bearing on whether 
communicative acts should qualify as SPEECH. As long as a communicative act is 
significantly obligation-enacting, they say, it should be placed outside the domain 
of SPEECH, even if obligation-enactment isn’t its primary aim or effect. What’s the 
upshot of this change? Suppose person A makes a racist remark, and that this 
enacts social obligations in the context of utterance (e.g., by activating latent ra-
cial hierarchies), but suppose also that this obligation-enactment isn’t the pri-
mary aim or effect of A’s remark. By getting rid of the ‘dominance’ criterion, 
Maitra and McGowan want to allow, pace Greenawalt, that an utterance like this 
should be located outside the boundaries of SPEECH.50  
Here is how this type of method for defining SPEECH would operate in theory. 
Suppose we’re considering a proposal to regulate some form of apparently harm-
ful communicative action, e.g., Homophobic Hellfire Preaching, or HHP.51 Under 
the approach we see in First Amendment theory, the question of whether HHP 
qualifies as SPEECH is answered by asking whether, and to what degree, this type 
of communication is implicated in the goods and ideals in light of which a higher 
standard of justification in general has to be satisfied in order for SPEECH to be 
justifiably restricted. Under Greenawalt’s approach to defining SPEECH, by con-
trast, we don’t cross-check HHP with our justifications for free speech directly, 
like this; instead, we classify HHP as either SPEECH or non-SPEECH depending on 
whether it satisfies our abstract sorting criterion, e.g., for Greenawalt, being ‘sub-
stantially and dominantly situation altering’. The free speech ARGUMENTS still 
play a part in this, insofar as the abstract sorting criterion is supposed to be 
crafted to track the crucial distinction, between communicative acts that merit 
                                                     
50 Maitra & McGowan, supra note 44 (2007) at 54. 
51 What I have in mind here are sermons delivered to church congregations, which espouse a deeply het-
eronormative sexual morality, and a doctrine of salvation that asserts a causal connection between sexual 
impurity and damnation. 
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special protection, qua free speech, and those that don’t. But because these classi-
ficatory judgments are rendered using an abstract criterion, they are more me-
chanical, less beholden to prior prejudices about what should and shouldn’t be 
counted as SPEECH, and less susceptible to the kind of ad hoc justificatory shoe-
horning that we’re drawn into, when asking a question like ‘does HHP partake of 
the ideal of democratic participation?’, or any parallel question about whether 
some malign form of communication connects-up in any manner with any of the 
justificatory ideals that free speech ARGUMENTS invoke.52 The merit of 
Greenawalt’s method – the hope behind it, at least – is that by making these judg-
ments abstract and criterial, it’s easier for us to apply the whole free speech ap-
paratus in only those cases that really do trigger the relevant normative concerns. 
6. Substantiality, dominance, and significance 
One odd thing about Greenawalt’s approach to reinstating a speech-conduct dis-
tinction is its implied notion that SPEECH – i.e. communicative acts that aren’t 
substantially situation-altering – don’t succeed in or aspire to ‘changing the social 
world’. Granted, claims of opinion or putative fact don’t alter agents’ responsibil-
ities and reasons in precisely the same way that promises and threats do. Never-
theless, for anyone engaged in scholarly research and writing, it seems strange – 
verging on a kind of performative contradiction – to say that bona fide SPEECH dif-
fers from mere verbal conduct by dint of its being inert with respect to the social 
world. One needn’t be a radical linguistic constructivist in order to think that 
many types of SPEECH, even ones that don’t fulfil the ‘substantially situation-al-
tering act’ criterion, nonetheless do have a significant influence in shaping the so-
cial world. This is an issue I’ll return to in §9. For our purposes here, the deeper 
problem with Greenawalt’s approach is its inability to determine what counts as 
a ‘substantially situation-altering act’ when dealing with hard or contested cases. 
The provisional conclusion we arrived at in §4 was that SPEECH needs to be de-
fined with reference to free speech’s underlying purposes, but that this is best 
achieved via some kind of abstract, generalizable method, which can be used to 
systematically distinguish the communicative acts that really do merit protection 
against legal restriction from the ones that don’t. This is what Greenawalt tries 
to provide. But when we look at the criteria he proposes for making the requisite 
systematic distinctions, we see that they require too much interpretative discre-
tion in their application for them to informatively guide judgments about which 
types of communicative conduct are to be sorted into which class. Return to the 
example of Homophobic Hellfire Preaching. Is HHP dominantly and substan-
tially situation-altering? Well, suppose one is a gay 15 year-old, dragooned into 
attending church every Sunday, where one is presented with heated sermons 
                                                     
52 As in the way Dworkin strains to situate pornography within the protective domain of ‘free speech’; see 
Ronald Dworkin, “Is There a Right to Pornography?” (1981) 1:2 Oxford J Leg Stud 177. 
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which tell one – purportedly with authority – that one’s sexual desires render one 
worthy of damnation, and will result in precisely that if acted upon.53 Is such com-
munication situation-altering? Does it change the social world one lives in, by 
shifting rights or obligations or both? And if we were to say that HHP is situation-
altering, the next question is: is it dominantly so (is this the primary aim or effect 
of the speech) and substantially so (are the shifts in obligations substantial)? These 
are awkward questions. On one hand, the fact that HHP is an expression of reli-
gious convictions and ethical opinions suggests that – according to conventional 
ideas about free speech coverage – it uncontroversially qualifies as SPEECH, and mer-
its protection against legal restriction accordingly. On the other hand, the fact 
that HHP – for some adolescents who are immersed in evangelical communities 
– will engender self-hatred, legitimize practices of violent bullying, and support 
noxious social hierarchies, gives us compelling reasons to judge that HHP is dom-
inantly and substantially situation-altering, and thus to subtract it from the pro-
tected domain of SPEECH. I won’t press the argument further either way. My point 
is about Greenawalt’s method’s inability to offer guidance in thinking about hard 
cases like these. It can’t provide guidance in judgments about what counts as 
SPEECH, because all the key terms that it employs in its sorting criteria – ‘domi-
nant’, ‘substantial’, ‘obligations’, and ‘rights’ – admit of multiple interpretations, 
so that we’re left with little choice but to look beyond these criteria – either to 
independent judgments about what SPEECH should encompass, or else to inde-
pendent ethical judgements about what HHP does and how the law should re-
spond to it – in order to resolve our classificatory quandary. The hope of the 
Greenawalt method was that these judgments could be regimented, and relocated 
to a deliberative space within which prejudices, pressures, and partisanship 
would be less likely to cloud our vision about what a free speech framework 
should be and should aim for. But it appears doubtful that they can. 
Greenawalt defends his method by claiming that it vindicates prior judgments 
about what should and shouldn’t count as SPEECH. Most jurisdictions that en-
dorse free speech are already committed to the idea that verbal threats, perjuries, 
and contracts don’t qualify as SPEECH for the purposes of free speech. Greenawalt 
hopes to explain why these judgments run the way they do, namely, because all 
these types of communication are dominantly and substantially situation-alter-
ing. Maitra and McGowan follow suit. They say their account generates ‘the right 
results’ in the classification of things like contracting speech, discriminatory 
speech, and criminal solicitation, by which they mean that their account matches 
up with the already widely-accepted position that these kinds of communicative 
acts shouldn’t qualify as SPEECH. But the problem, again, is that it’s very hard to 
extrapolate from this, given that we don’t have any independent conception of 
                                                     
53 I’m not claiming that this is the ‘correct’, or most biblically accurate, or most charitable view of Chris-
tian sexual morality and soteriology (or that Christianity is worse than other major religions on this is-
sue). I’m just saying that hate-filled carry-on of this kind, laced with threats of eternal punishment, is 
preached with some regularity at some evangelical churches. 
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significance (in relation to ‘obligation-enactment’) to govern our classification. Is a 
‘significant’ obligation enacted when someone greets me on the sidewalk (i.e. an 
obligation to reciprocate), or when someone writes something silly on the inter-
net (the obligation to correct them)? Naturally Maitra and McGowan want to say 
that these obligations aren’t significant. But how does their account actually sub-
stantiate that verdict? They say these obligations are 
Easily met, and there would be no serious repercussions even if those obligations 
went unmet. By contrast… “You’re fired, said to an employee… is significantly 
obligation-enacting, since it frees the employee from significant obligations… and 
creates significant new obligations… Our thesis is just that significantly obliga-
tion-enacting utterances ought to be uncovered.54  
The words I’ve italicized in the above passage show the extent of the problem one 
faces in trying to get determinate guidance from the relevant notion of signifi-
cance. To say ‘it’s a significant obligation if it’s not easily met’ is to give content to 
one flexible criterion by invoking another one. When we look at a pair of com-
municative act-types for which our classificatory judgments are generally settled 
– say, scholarly research (SPEECH), versus perjury (non-SPEECH) – we can explain 
these judgements by saying that the latter enacts ‘significant’ obligations and the 
former doesn’t. But when we turn to a more controversial case, like HHP, it’s ra-
ther optimistic to think that our abstract sorting criterion can disinterestedly ar-
bitrate matters to resolve the classificatory controversy. What will typically oc-
cur is that each party will begin with some conviction about whether HHP does 
or doesn’t warrant special protection against government restriction, and from 
this each party will try to retrofit their appraisal – that HHP does/doesn’t enact 
significant obligations – to substantiate the prior judgment. Where a method of 
this type aims to provide a clear and consistent classificatory system, it ends up 
misrepresenting classification-by-fiat as if it were a kind of quasi-objective exer-
cise in the categorization of social intercourse.55 
The only truly unbiased, properly criterial and systematic way of defining non-
SPEECH, is by way of a bare linguistic criterion: it’s SPEECH if it employs linguistic 
tokens, otherwise it is non-SPEECH. At least one author opts for something like 
                                                     
54 Maitra & McGowan, supra note 44 (2010) at 352 [emphases added]. 
55 In some respects Maitra and McGowan’s work on this topic is an artefact of the dialectic that they’re 
responding to in First Amendment doctrine and discourse. Where Greenawalt favors his approach 
because he thinks there is something like a natural-kind distinction between SPEECH and non-SPEECH, 
which simply requires illumination, Maitra and McGowan use his type of methodology primarily as a 
creative way to show why things like anti-hate speech laws (which they think can be justified in the 
abstract) can also be made compatible with established First Amendment doctrine, despite prevailing 
opinion to the contrary. If hate speech is customarily classified as SPEECH, and if this makes it effectively 
impossible to legally regulate it, then – as a practical argumentative aim – adapting a well-regarded piece 
of First Amendment theorizing about coverage to argue that hate speech shouldn’t be covered by free 
speech principles is a sensible and savvy maneuver. My criticisms here are naturally only concerned with 
the deeper theoretical adequacy of this methodological approach to free speech coverage questions.  
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this, suggesting that “a fundamental difference obtains between symbolic and 
non-symbolic interactions”, and that free speech concerns are “always implicated 
in the former, and only occasionally in the latter”.56 But this definitional method 
is pointless. Once we detach our definitional task (i.e. distinguishing SPEECH v. 
non-SPEECH) from our larger theoretical task (i.e. formulating a definition that 
answers to the ARGUMENTS), we can define SPEECH however we like, since noth-
ing at all hinges on it. 
7. The subtraction by comparison strategy 
In trying to carry out the required definitional work, we can’t fully avoid the in-
fluence of biases, dogmas, and conventional presumptions. The challenge is to 
find a method for defining SPEECH which, as best as we can manage in spite of 
this, answers to the ARGUMENTS. I’ve argued that we get nowhere by seeking a 
criterial formula that distinguishes SPEECH from non-SPEECH. But the root prob-
lem here had better not be the bare fact that categorizations are required. If prin-
cipled categorization of different kinds of acts is impossible, then Fish was right: 
free speech theory is hogwash, irrespective of our method for defining SPEECH. So 
how can we advance? Where’s the solid ground to build on? There are some un-
controversial paradigm cases – of both SPEECH and non-SPEECH – that might 
serve as reference-points in our classificatory task. Anyone with any sympathy at 
all for free speech agrees that SPEECH should encompass things like scientific re-
search, political dissent, and subversive art. Similarly, practically everyone who 
believes in a politics of free speech agrees that SPEECH should not encompass 
something like perjury; that is, the fact that people use words when perjuring 
themselves doesn’t mean that anti-perjury statutes should be regulated by a lim-
iting, free-speech-based side-constraint. So here’s another kind of Subtractive 
Approach to defining SPEECH. Identify some forms of communicative action 
which incontrovertibly (by the lights of all interested parties) don’t qualify as 
SPEECH, and use these as a comparative guide for subtracting any other types of 
communicative acts whose malign social operations are relevantly similar to these 
paradigmatic instances of non-SPEECH. 
In this type of subtraction by paradigm-case comparison we still need some expla-
nation of why the paradigm case is non-SPEECH. But unlike in Greenawalt’s 
method, this explanation needn’t involve an appeal to criteria that purportedly 
define non-SPEECH in abstract, general terms. Take the example of a restaurateur 
putting a sign in her window that says ‘whites only’. The malign operations of 
such a communicative act are obvious, and could be spelled-out in a number of 
                                                     
56 Franklyn S Haiman, “Speech Acts” and the First Amendment (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 
1993) at 5. 
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different directions. Suffice it to say, minimally just societies prohibit discrimina-
tory segregation based on race, and in such societies to hang a ‘whites only’ sign 
is ipso facto to perform an unlawful discriminatory act. This seems like a good rea-
son to count ‘whites only’ signs among the communications that don’t qualify as 
SPEECH. But have we provided a general criterion for defining non-SPEECH? No. 
All we should say is that ‘whites only’ signs are one of the communications to be 
subtracted from SPEECH. The considerations that favor this judgment may or may 
not be related to the reasons why ‘whites only’ signs are properly criminalizable, 
but all we’re committing to is the view that if other communicative acts serve as 
tools of segregation and discrimination, like ‘whites only’ signs do, then they 
should likewise be subtracted from the domain of SPEECH. This method needn’t 
generalize beyond the specific verdict, e.g., by claiming that being discriminatory 
or unlawful is what makes communication non-SPEECH.57 
This is the type of method that’s used in a more recent piece by McGowan,58 in 
which she argues that targeted, face-to-face expressions of racist sentiment, in 
public spaces (e.g., on the subway), operate like ‘whites only’ signs – that they 
are, in her words, ‘verbal acts of racial discrimination’ – and should be subtracted 
from SPEECH and disentitled to special protections accordingly. The argument 
that McGowan offers in defense of her claims about the functional equivalence of 
the two kinds of communicative acts is a plausible one, although it’s not directly 
relevant to the key point I want to make here.59 The point is about this method 
for distinguishing SPEECH from non-SPEECH, and it’s that if we are committed to 
following some version of the Subtractive Approach to defining SPEECH, this is 
                                                     
57 Sunstein appears to endorse the view I’m cautioning against here. He says all communicative action 
should qualify as SPEECH unless it “amounts to the commission of an independently illegal act” or “is 
evidence that the act has been committed”; Cass R Sunstein, “Words, Conduct, Caste” (1993) 60:3 U Chi-
cago L Rev 795 at 836. But this won’t do. In a society where blasphemy is criminalized, for instance, the 
Courts could profess a commitment to Sunstein’s brand of free speech, just by noting that blasphemers 
are engaged in criminal conduct, such that no SPEECH is in fact restricted in their being punished. Determi-
nations about which acts are criminalized ought to be answerable to prior judgments about what quali-
fies as SPEECH, not vice versa. Sunstein is right to observe a distinction between cases in which an utterance 
constitutes a criminal act (like a threat), and cases in which an utterance immediately causes a criminal act 
(like an incitement). Still, in some cases we should privilege the former as SPEECH. Yelling “the King is an 
idiot” on the street doesn’t cause sedition, it constitutes sedition. But nevertheless, sedition (in at least 
some of its forms) is a type of conduct that liberal free speech principles should protect, not something 
to be placed outside their sphere of protection simply on account of its being identified as a type of con-
duct. 
58 Mary Kate McGowan, “On ‘Whites Only’ Signs and Racist Hate Speech: Verbal Acts of Racial Discrim-
ination” in Ishani Maitra & Mary Kate McGowan, eds, Speech and Harm: Controversies over Free Speech (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 121. This piece is not tightly linked to the co-authored pieces dis-
cussed in §§5–6, Maitra & McGowan, supra note 44 (2007; 2010), which emulate Greenawalt’s program 
of seeking to identify the criterial features of verbal non-SPEECH. 
59 The argument, in brief, is that both communicative acts are ‘exercitives’ – speech acts that enact per-
missions/prohibitions – which have the capacity to enact permissibility facts by virtue of general features 
of pragmatic accommodation in conversation, and which enact permissibility facts that are discrimina-
tory. This account builds on McGowan’s earlier work on conversational exercitives as developed in, e.g., 
Mary Kate McGowan, “Oppressive Speech” (2009) 87:3 Australasian J Phil 389. 
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about as good as things will get. If we attempt to formulate any general criterion 
for communicative non-SPEECH, we’ll end up indulging in the false pretenses to 
systematicity and impartiality that were evident under the Greenawalt method. 
Muddling through, in the space between policy-making and constitutional inter-
pretation – à la First Amendment jurisprudence – will transform the question of 
how SPEECH is defined into an occasion for culture warfare and conceptual ger-
rymandering. The best we can do is take whatever cases there are that we all agree 
should be subtracted from SPEECH – like perjury, like ‘whites only’ signs – and by 
way of piecemeal pair-wise comparisons, see whether any further communicative 
acts can be singled-out for subtraction.   
If this is right – if ‘subtraction-by-comparison’ is the least problematic version of 
the Subtractive Approach – and if this method for defining SPEECH is of decidedly 
limited use, due to its very structure, then it’s time to consider wholesale alterna-
tives. As a way into this, consider a strand of thought that is prominent in the free 
speech tradition right back to Mill,60 that’s in effect in the classic examples of free 
speech exceptions from Mill and Holmes (see §1), which is made explicit in 
Greenawalt’s work,61 and which is woven into McGowan’s arguments about 
‘whites only’ signs. ‘Whites only’ signs don’t qualify as SPEECH, McGowan says, 
“exactly because of what they do”, and because “we have reason to believe that 
some racist hate speech does the very same thing, we have reason to place that 
subset of racist hate speech outside the scope of a free speech principle”.62 What 
I want to flag here is the thesis that’s implicated when we stress what a commu-
nicative act does in order to explain why it shouldn’t qualify as SPEECH. The im-
plicature of this is that communicative acts qualify as SPEECH, except in those 
instances in which somebody’s words burst out of the inert realm of ideas, and 
                                                     
60 On one hand, Mill characterizes SPEECH in terms of ‘liberty of thought and discussion’ and develops 
ARGUMENTS in defense of it based on that characterization; but at the same time, as Haworth says, there 
is “a great deal which [Mill] does want to allow, which doesn’t easily match the paradigm, but which he 
nevertheless wants to defend in terms of the same argument he applies to thought and discussion”; Alan 
Haworth, Free Speech (London: Routledge, 1998) at 32. Mill fails to see how much diversity there is in the 
kind of communicative action that the liberal state might want to protect, Haworth says, because under 
his analysis, everything that’s worthy of protection must be shoehorned into the conceptual category of 
‘thought and discussion’.  
61 For example, in the following: “A pervasive theme of this book is the difference between saying some-
thing with words and doing something with words. I have stressed the importance of the speaker’s aims 
in deciding how particular speech should be regarded. But many of the subjects we have considered show 
how much speech importantly does something, apart from influencing actions because people are per-
suaded by the ideas that are communicated. Many of those who claim that speech… undermines equality 
emphasize what this speech does, and they call on the government to stop the harmful effects”; Kent 
Greenawalt, Fighting Words: Individuals, Communities, and Liberties of Speech (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1995) at 152.  
62 McGowan, supra note 58 at 145 [emphases added]. 
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transmogrify into ‘actions’, ‘doings’, or social ‘moves’.63 McGowan quite rightly 
insists that words aren’t always inert and ethereal; that they do ‘change stuff’. But 
the implication – here and also in many quarters of free speech theory – is that it’s 
precisely in those cases in which words ‘change stuff’ that we should subtract 
them from the domain SPEECH. However, the communicative acts we’re trying to 
protect from government overreach, in a political order regulated by free speech 
principles, do not exist in a quasi-inert realm of pure ideas. Much of what we 
want to specially protect is communicative action that impacts upon and changes 
the world, some of it for better, some of it – in the short term, at least – for worse. 
The Subtractive Approach coaxes us into ways of conceptualizing the SPEECH v. 
non-SPEECH distinction which locate all capacity for impact and change on the 
non-SPEECH side of the divide. And that’s a distortion – a commonplace distor-
tion, but a distortion nonetheless – of the political concerns that underwrite free 
speech ARGUMENTS. 
8. Addition instead of subtraction? 
One step towards ridding ourselves of these distortions may be to take note of 
the classificatory method that was adjacent to the one McGowan offers. There 
are indeed paradigm cases of non-SPEECH, like perjury and ‘whites only’ signs, 
whose status as non-SPEECH is uncontroversial among proponents of free speech. 
But there are also uncontroversial paradigm cases of SPEECH that may likewise 
serve as informative reference-points for our classificatory task. As I suggested 
above, all free speech sympathizers will agree that SPEECH should encompass ac-
ademic research, political dissent, and subversive art. What makes these things 
paradigm cases of SPEECH, in short, is that they so clearly implicate the benefits 
and/or dangers adverted to in the ARGUMENTS. Instead of trying to differentiate 
SPEECH from non- SPEECH by extrapolating (by comparison) from paradigm in-
stances of non-SPEECH, then, couldn’t we construct our classificatory system by 
extrapolating (by comparison) from these paradigm cases of SPEECH itself? This 
method we’re edging towards is an inversion of the Subtractive Approach, as fore-
shadowed in my title, i.e. the ‘Additive Approach’. Schauer envisioned all this in 
an old paper, describing the two methods as ‘defining-out’ and ‘defining-in’.64 Ra-
ther than categorizing all acts of communication as SPEECH by default, then try-
ing to make principled subtractions to exclude the communicative acts that don’t 
merit the special protections owed to SPEECH, we could instead refrain from cat-
egorizing anything as SPEECH by default, and only install things in that class via 
                                                     
63 Here I’m echoing the kinds of expressions used by critics of free speech orthodoxy like Fish, supra note 
35 at 125-26, and MacKinnon; see Catharine A MacKinnon, Only Words (London: HarperCollins, 1994) at 
8. 
64 Frederick Schauer, “Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts” (1981) 34:2 Vand L Rev 
265. 
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principled additions which include the communicative acts that do merit the special 
protections owed to SPEECH.  
If a straightforward endorsement of this Additive Approach was the intended up-
shot of my critical analysis in §§3–7, there would be at least two objections in the 
offing. Here’s the first one. These two approaches, Subtractive and Additive, are 
both methods for categorizing acts based on whether, in light of the ARGUMENTS, 
those acts do or don’t merit special protection against legal restriction. If the con-
ditions under which these methods are applied allow for clear-sighted readings 
of the ARGUMENTS, and of which act-types are implicated by them, then the two 
methods should yield identical categorizations. Assuming that our conditions are 
not conducive to such perfect perspicacity, the difference between the two meth-
ods will, in practice, just be a difference in types of error. Errors under the Addi-
tive Approach will be false negatives; things that should be protected under the 
auspices of free speech won’t be. Errors under the Subtractive Approach will be 
false positives; things that shouldn’t be protected under the auspices of free 
speech will be. Schauer thinks this counts against the Additive Approach, be-
cause we should “attempt to ensure that decisions under uncertainty will be bi-
ased away from the restriction of those values we hold to be of greatest im-
portance”.65 In other words, overprotection is better than under-protection, given 
that the goods we’re promoting and dangers we’re guarding against are especially 
weighty. But the Libertarian slant that guides Schauer’s judgments here is ulti-
mately tenuous. Free speech discourse does well when it comes to doomsaying 
about the dangers of under-protection, of governments not being subject to ro-
bust enough constraints on their attempts to legally suppress communicative 
conduct. These dangers are real, and vigilantly guarding against them is the right 
response. But free speech discourse does a less impressive job when it comes to 
doomsaying about the genuine and countervailing dangers of overprotection. If 
dual-use research, say, or genocidal propaganda, are accorded too robust an im-
munity against legal restriction, then the dangers of this are – I’ll err on the side 
of understatement here – at least as bad as the perils emphasized by theorists who 
doomsay about under-protection. To deny this is either to exaggerate the badness 
of censorious tyranny – by pretending that it’s worse than a global pandemic, or 
mass genocidal violence – or simply to play dumb about the issues.66 The proper 
thing to say, is that there are fateful dangers associated with overprotection and 
under-protection alike. If the likelihood of false negatives on the Additive Ap-
proach is equivalent to the likelihood of false positives on the Subtractive Ap-
proach, then in relation to this criterion of assessment, we should score the two 
                                                     
65 Ibid at 281. 
66 On incitement to genocide, see, e.g., Susan Benesch, “Vile Crime or Inalienable Right: Defining Incite-
ment to Genocide” (2008) 48:3 Va J Intl L 485; Lynne Tirrell, “Genocidal Language Games” in Ishani 
Maitra & Mary Kate McGowan, eds, Speech & Harm: Controversies over Free Speech (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2012) 174. On dual-use research, see, e.g., Nicholas G Evans, “Dual-use Decision Making: Rela-
tional and Positional Issues” (2014) 32:3 Monash Bioethics Review 268. 
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methods as a draw. What would constitute a tie-breaker would be some reason to 
think that, when put to use in real-world (i.e. in imperfectly-perspicuous) condi-
tions, one method will yield fewer classificatory errors period.  
But this brings us to a more telling concern about the Additive Approach. There’s 
no real reason to think that switching from subtraction to addition will make it 
easier to overcome the distortions, biases, and other sources of error that make it 
hard to discern which communicative acts merit special protection as SPEECH. 
Whether we’re adding or subtracting, the interpretative tasks are basically the 
same: review the reasons that obtain, in light of free speech ARGUMENTS, for pro-
tecting conduct of type α, then examine the communicative act-type that we’re 
trying to classify as SPEECH or non-SPEECH, and see whether it matches the char-
acteristics of α. And if the interpretative tasks are the same under either approach, 
then the frequency of classificatory errors probably will be too. Switching to the 
Additive Approach, while leaving all else in place, won’t remedy the classificatory 
difficulties that arise under the Subtractive Approach. 
If there’s a good reason to prefer the Additive to the Subtractive Approach, then 
it has to be something like the thought raised at the end of §7, i.e. that the Sub-
tractive Approach coaxes us into thinking about the SPEECH v. conduct distinc-
tion in a way that distorts our interpretations of the ARGUMENTS and the com-
municative act-types they implicate. This is what my preference for the Additive 
Approach boils down to, and there are two distortions that I’ll discuss. The first 
consists in the notion that the communicative acts encompassed within SPEECH 
are, of their essential nature, forms of non-action or non-conduct. The second 
consists in us thinking of either classification within that binary as a group whose 
members all share an essential property or exhibit some common trait. I’ll discuss 
these in §9 and §10 respectively. To recapitulate my point here: if we adopt the 
Additive Approach to defining SPEECH, while continuing to conceive of SPEECH 
under the influence of these twin misapprehensions, then we’ll be no better-
placed to perform our classificatory tasks than we were in using the Subtractive 
Approach. Switching to addition only constitutes progress to the extent that it 
helps us to appropriately reconceptualize the categories of protected communi-
cative acts into which things are going to be ‘added’. 
9. SPEECH as conduct’s antithesis 
In some cases the characterization of SPEECH as communication which is of its 
essence ‘not-conduct’ is more explicit, like when Charles Collier speaks about the 
“obviously experienced differences between speech and conduct”,67 or when Mar-
tin Redish suggests that it’s “almost certainly true in the overwhelming majority 
                                                     
67 Charles W Collier, “Hate Speech and the Mind-body Problem: a Critique of Postmodern Censorship 
Theory” (2001) 7:2 Leg Theory 203 at 233. 
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of cases that speech is less immediately dangerous than conduct”.68,69 As we ob-
served in §7, however, in the discussion of McGowan on ‘whites only’ signs, this 
view of SPEECH’s essential nature is commonly manifested implicitly, when an 
author is framing the case for subtracting some class of communications from 
SPEECH, by stressing the fact that the communications in question “are acts and 
not just words”.70 
The inadequacy of this characterization is evident when we examine the sub-
stance of the ARGUMENTS and observe the types of communications that they ad-
vert to as being in need of special protection. What we see, is that ‘SPEECH’ en-
compasses all sorts of tangible, ‘impactful’, ‘difference-making’ forms of behavior 
– things that are conduct plain and simple. (i) A scientist wants to share data with 
collaborators and publicize her findings. The government wants to impose strict 
regulatory oversights on this, because it’s worried about the costs of dangerous 
data falling into the hands of its enemies, or lucrative data falling into the hands 
of parties that didn’t invest in it. Epistemic ARGUMENTS tell us we mustn’t allow 
governments to enact such oversight, based on bare cost-benefit analyses, be-
cause they’re subject to pressures and self-interested biases in ways that will sys-
tematically push them towards overregulation, to our collective detriment over 
time. (ii) A political radical is circulating messages, telling others to engage in 
militant political opposition to the Corporatocracy that’s destroying the world. 
The government wants to quell these messages, so as to inhibit opposition to its 
Corporatocratic elements and shore up the status quo. Democratic ARGUMENTS 
tell us we must disallow the state’s suppression of troublemaking dissent, again, 
because of various pressures and biases that systematically motivate governments 
towards over-suppression, to society’s long-term detriment. (iii) An iconoclastic 
artist plans an exhibition of works which deeply offend certain religious ele-
ments. The government wants to shut down the exhibition, to protect those reli-
gious elements against perceived religious vilification. Expressive ARGUMENTS tell 
us that we mustn’t allow governments to exercise such censorious powers, as this 
breeds a culture of narrow-mindedness and conformity, to our collective detri-
ment in the long-run. We could multiply examples all day. All of these communi-
cations are things that do – and are intended to, and are threatened with restriction 
precisely because they – make a potent causal impact on our society. 
                                                     
68 Martin H Redish, Freedom of Expression: A Critical Analysis (Charlottesville: Michie, 1984) at 5. 
69 For persuasive critiques of the notion hinted at in these remarks, i.e. that SPEECH is of its nature harm-
less or inherently less harmful that bona fide conduct (also sometimes called the ‘sticks and stones’ view of 
SPEECH), see Frederick Schauer, “The Phenomenology of Speech and Harm” (1993) 103:4 Ethics 635; Su-
san J Brison, “Speech, Harm, and the Mind-body Problem in First Amendment Jurisprudence” (1998) 4:1 
Leg Theory 39. 
70 Phrases like this crop up frequently in articles on the boundaries of free speech; this phrase comes from 
David Archard, “Insults, Free Speech, and Offensiveness” (2014) 31:2 Journal of Applied Philosophy 127 at 
139 [emphasis added]. 
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Others in the literature have occasionally criticized this regrettable propensity to 
characterize SPEECH as being, of its essence, unlike conduct. In reply to Thomas 
Emerson’s sanguine proposal, that we could classify communicative acts as 
SPEECH or conduct depending on whether they ‘partake’ of the essential qualities 
of expression or action,71 Edwin Baker hits the mark nicely. “Neither common 
sense nor the purposes of the system of freedom of expression” he says, “work to 
distinguish between the ‘essential qualities’ of expression and action”; rather, put 
simply, “most conduct falls into both categories”.72 Or to take an earlier example, 
consider this passage from John Hart Ely’s classic paper on flag desecration. 
Burning a draft card to express opposition to the draft is… 100% action and 
100% expression. It involves no conduct that is not at the same time commu-
nication, and no communication that does not result from conduct. Attempts 
to determine which element predominates… inevitably degenerate into ques-
tion-begging judgments about whether the activity should be protected.73 
So why, if the literature has alerted us to its faults, is there still this impulse to 
think of SPEECH and conduct as opposites? Often, I suspect, this isn’t borne of any 
actual conviction as to the inertness of ‘mere’ opinions or words, but just the fact 
that SPEECH – whether or not it genuinely is special – nevertheless needs to be spe-
cial in order for the free speech tradition to make sense (here I’m paraphrasing 
Schauer).74 By which I mean: the way SPEECH is conceptualized may be affected 
by us feeling a need to rationalize its ‘specialness’, by attributing a special form of 
inertness to it. In any case, there’s only one real argument that I know of, for this 
view, which is that (some or all) paradigmatic instances of SPEECH – scientific 
research, protest, iconoclastic art – are things that don’t have their impact on the 
world directly. When communications like these change the world, they do so by 
affecting the thoughts or beliefs of others, who subsequently alter their own con-
duct. Of course, affecting people’s minds is a way of having an effect on the world. 
Ultimately, this argument trades on ideas about responsibility. When A says to B 
‘anthropogenic climate change is all made up’, and B then decides to trade-in her 
Prius to buy a Hummer, we attribute responsibility for this choice to B. We rec-
ognize that A’s SPEECH causally instigates B’s purchase, but we judge that the 
outcome results from B’s agential intervention, in a way that ‘screens off’ A’s ac-
countability for it. This type of thinking about what SPEECH is, and why it should 
be specially protected, figures in the work of plenty of free speech theorists,75 and 
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73 John Hart Ely, “Flag Desecration: a Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First 
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74 Schauer, supra note 4 at 1306. 
75 See Thomas Scanlon, “A Theory of Freedom of Expression” (1972) 1:2 Philosophy & Public Affairs 204; 
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issues about responsibility for SPEECH’s effects are naturally to the fore in work 
on incitement to violence.76 Even if there isn’t any neat and natural distinction 
between words that alter the world indirectly (i.e. SPEECH) and those that alter 
the world directly (i.e. non-SPEECH or communicative conduct), it’s hard to deny 
that there is something important in this line of thought. There is some axis of 
difference here, and the concepts that we reach for to describe this difference – 
autonomy, persuasion, intellectual agency – are thematically central to the force 
of free speech ARGUMENTS. The question is how to acknowledge this, without 
recommitting the error of imagining that the things the ARGUMENTS tell us to 
protect, as SPEECH, exist in an inert domain of mere ideas. One option would be 
to keep invoking the SPEECH v. conduct distinction, much the same as ever, and 
just make a more concerted effort to resist the mischaracterizations that I’ve been 
criticizing. No more saying ‘α shouldn’t be protected under the auspices of free 
speech, since it’s more of an act than an idea’, thus implying that the things to be 
protected by free speech aren’t actions, or are essentially unlike actions. Instead, 
we might acknowledge that various paradigmatic instances of SPEECH – protest, 
scholarship, art, etc. – achieve their effects indirectly, by affecting the thoughts of 
other people, while simultaneously emphasizing that they’re bona fide, world-al-
tering actions. We could attempt to stress the ‘causal potency’ of the communi-
cations that we want to specially protect, as SPEECH,77 while asserting the neces-
sity of their protection all the same. 
The proposal I want to advance, however, represents a more dramatic departure 
from theoretical orthodoxy. Having spent a good while diagnosing the difficulties 
that come with defining ‘SPEECH’ in a way that answers to those ARGUMENTS 
that confer meaning on that definitional task, I’m now going to argue that our talk 
of ‘SPEECH’, as an overarching category denoting the things that merit special pro-
tection, is in fact part of what compromises definitional clarity in this arena. 
‘SPEECH’ should ultimately be subdivided, and then jettisoned.  
                                                     
Expression” (1991) 91:2 Colum L Rev 334; Thomas Nagel, “Personal Rights and Public Space” (1995) 24:2 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 83; Evan Simpson, “Responsibilities for Hateful Speech” (2006) 12:2 Leg The-
ory 157. 
76 See Lawrence, supra note 24; Larry Alexander, “Incitement and Freedom of Speech” in David Kretzmer 
& Francine Kershman Hazan, eds, Freedom of Speech and Incitement Against Democracy (London: Kluwer Law 
International, 2000) 101. 
77 As in passages like this: “Marx and even Bentham have probably nurtured more acts of terrorism than 
all the soapbox firebrands put together... Does that mean that [governments] should ban Marxist and 
consequentialist philosophy or impose a religious orthodoxy on its citizens? To ask that question is to 
answer it, for any country that pursues security through such repression is… unworthy of salvaging”; Al-
exander, supra note 76 at 118. 
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10. Eliminating SPEECH by subdivision 
Free speech ARGUMENTS run along at least four distinct trajectories. And while 
the cumulative force of the ARGUMENTS is usually taken to be that we should 
accord a special status to a certain class of communicative acts, i.e. SPEECH, there 
is no unified – certainly no simple and intuitive – class of acts that the ARGU-
MENTS nominate to receive that privileged status. This is a paraphrase of a passage 
that Thomas Scanlon wrote more than 40 years ago.78 Thoughts of a similar kind 
also crop up repeatedly in Schauer’s work, such as in the following passage. 
Freedom of speech need not have any one ‘essential’ feature. It is much more 
likely a bundle of interrelated principles sharing no common set of necessary 
and sufficient defining characteristics… the protection of political discussion 
and criticism, the aversion to censorship of art, and the desire to retain open 
inquiry in science and other academic disciplines… are principles not reduci-
ble to any one common core. Any attempt to do so is likely to… distort all of 
the principles involved.79 
The idea that ‘free speech’ refers to a heterogeneous grab-bag of communications, 
and not some unified class of communications, isn’t new. My proposal is to take 
this idea more seriously, and restructure the categories that organize free speech 
principles accordingly. Free speech can be divided into a plurality of principles, 
each drawing from a particular type of ARGUMENT, and imposing its own con-
straints on government action. In place of a ‘free speech principle’ per se, this 
would give us several more narrowly-focused principles, which jointly provide 
protections for all the types of communicative action which really do merit it, in 
light of the ARGUMENTS. So: protest, satire, and political argument enjoy special 
protection against legal restriction, being selected for this privilege by a Freedom 
of Protest/Politicking principle. Journalism, scientific inquiry, and academic debate 
enjoy protection against legal restriction, being nominated for this by a Freedom of 
Inquiry principle. Art, literature, theatre, comedy, and cinema enjoy special pro-
tection against legal restriction, being nominated for this by a Freedom of Art prin-
ciple. And proselytism, religious texts, and ethical and spiritual advocacy enjoy 
special protection against legal restriction, being selected for this privilege by a 
Freedom of Conscientious Expression principle. The following table maps out these 
schematic, three-part relationships. 
 
 
 
                                                     
78 Scanlon, supra note 75 at 208. 
79 Schauer, supra note 64 at 277. 
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Arguments Communication Types Principle 
DEMOCRATIC ARGUMENTS: failing to specially 
protect certain kinds of communications un-
dermines the legitimacy and/or effectiveness 
of democratic politics. 
Protest, political dissent, 
criticism of public figures, 
satire, political debate 
Freedom 
of Protest / 
Politicking 
EPISTEMIC ARGUMENTS: failing to specially 
protect certain kinds of communications 
threatens various important social epistemic 
goods. 
Scholarly research, journal-
ism, reportage, public 
debate, informal and private 
research, other inquiry 
Freedom 
of Inquiry  
EXPRESSIVE ARGUMENTS: failing to specially 
protect certain kinds of communications 
jeopardizes goods related to creativity, au-
thentic cultural expression, and pleasure in 
the arts. 
Literature, visual arts, 
comedy, cinema, music, 
theatre, dance, avant garde 
performance 
Freedom 
of Art 
WORLDVIEW ARGUMENTS: failing to specially 
protect certain kinds of communications 
tends to lead to evils related to enforced or-
thodoxy, dogmatism, and the suppression of 
heresy. 
Proselytism, circulation of 
religious or ethical texts, 
advocacy on behalf of a 
particular cultural, spiritual, 
or ethical way of life 
 
Freedom 
of Consci-
entious 
Expression 
 
 
This approach isn’t committed to treating the four areas that I’ve identified here 
as the final word in free speech ARGUMENTS. Some theorists will think other AR-
GUMENTS should be added into the mix (see note 19). Some will think the ARGU-
MENTS that I’ve presented should be merged, or explicated differently.80 What I’m 
ultimately endorsing is just this kind of schematic approach, which would obvi-
ate the need for a definition of SPEECH per se, because it would abandon the pre-
tense that the cogent free speech ARGUMENTS – if not these four, then the ARGU-
MENTS that are cogent – recommend special protection for some unified family of 
behaviors. Instead, it looks at each free speech ARGUMENT, ascertains the distinc-
tive types of communication therein singled-out for special protection, and pos-
tulates a separate side-constraint on government action which accords special 
protection to just those particular species of communication. 
                                                     
80 For instance, among the three kinds of fundamental interests which, on Cohen’s view, are secured by a 
system of expressive liberty, one of them (‘informational interests’) roughly corresponds with the values 
adverted to in Epistemic ARGUMENTS, and another of them (‘expressive interests’) corresponds very 
closely with the values adverted to in Expressive ARGUMENTS. But the third kind of fundamental inter-
ests (‘deliberative interests’), implicates values that, on my taxonomy, are adverted to by two different 
kinds of arguments, namely, Democratic and Worldview ARGUMENTS; see Cohen, supra note 13 at 223-
29. 
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To properly expound a free speech theory of this kind, much work is required 
beyond this inaugural restructuring maneuver. If we are applying a plurality of 
distinct side-constraints on government action, instead of a single multifaceted 
side-constraint (as in standard free speech theory), we’ll have to determine how 
each side-constraint operates by itself, and how they all interact. Some commu-
nicative entities – like artworks that express political dissent – will be covered 
by multiple principles, and thus questions about precedence of coverage will have 
to be addressed. Some of the newly-minted principles will demand something 
like standards of strict scrutiny, whereas others may only require intermediate 
scrutiny, or some other standard of legislative review. And the way that we think 
about content-neutrality could vary between the different principles; in other 
words, what counts as a content-based restriction may need to be assessed dif-
ferently under, say, Freedom of Art versus Freedom of Inquiry. In short, the intri-
cate machinery of legal policy will still have to be painstakingly engineered, in 
these and other respects. However, that’s not a reason for proponents of a stand-
ard (non-subdivided) approach to free speech theory to dismiss what I’m propos-
ing. Any sophisticated system of free speech that purports to answer to the AR-
GUMENTS will posit differential levels of protection, sometimes independent, 
sometimes overlapping, for different species of communicative acts.81  
The real question is what we gain by jettisoning the umbrella category of SPEECH, 
and restructuring principles of communicative liberty in this pluralistic, ramified 
fashion. Throughout my discussion, I’ve emphasized ‘answering to the ARGU-
MENTS’ as the most important attribute of a sound definitional method in this 
arena. If we’re going to specially protect a certain class of acts against legal re-
striction, then we need to describe and delimit the protected class in a way that 
doesn’t readily allow acts to be accorded this privilege unless they’re actually 
identified, by the ARGUMENTS, as meriting it. None of the ARGUMENTS can plau-
sibly be read as entailing that special protections are needed for something which 
would be fittingly denoted using a term as wide-reaching – and as susceptible to 
equivocal construals – as ‘SPEECH’. And therefore, by treating the ARGUMENTS as 
if they do all enjoin special protection for one class of behaviors, i.e. some multi-
farious set of communications denoted by ‘SPEECH’, standard free speech theory 
flunks the ‘answering’ test; it makes it too easy for acts to be accorded special 
legal privileges, even when they bear only a tenuous connection to the social pro-
cesses via which the goods and ideals adverted to in the ARGUMENTS are ad-
vanced or endangered. In saying this I don’t mean to claim that in a subdivided 
free speech system it would impossible for acts that aren’t nominated for protection 
by the ARGUMENTS to be accorded it anyway. The institutions that implement 
our principles of communicative liberty will still be staffed by (biased, error-
                                                     
81 Another issue with this approach is that it may turn out, on close inspection, that the different ARGU-
MENTS have culturally specific boundaries and culturally specific applications which cannot be ade-
quately captured at the level of abstract argument and principle; on this point see Koppelman, supra note 
42 at 700. 
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prone) human beings, and they’ll still be situated in (factionalized, corruptible) 
political communities. My contention is just that we’ll do better at protecting 
only those acts that genuinely merit it, if our classificatory questions and answers 
refer to narrower and more specific categories of communicative conduct, i.e. if 
we’re asking whether α is entitled to special protection as an instance of PROTEST, 
instead of asking whether α counts as SPEECH.82 Or to put it another way: defini-
tions of protected classes of communication will do better at answering to the 
ARGUMENTS, if the protected classes that they’re defining – like PROTEST, or 
JOURNALISM, or RELIGIOUS TEXTS – are things whose nature and boundaries can 
be discerned from the substance of the ARGUMENTS themselves. In standard free 
speech theorizing, the class of protected communicative behavior that needs to 
be defined, SPEECH, is an abstraction that’s at one remove from the substance of 
any of the ARGUMENTS, insofar as it’s meant to reach across them all, and encom-
pass a unified class of communications to which they all supposedly refer. The 
difficulty of defining this class in a way that answers to the ARGUMENTS isn’t so 
much the fault of any definitional method, as it is a result of us asking one um-
brella concept to do more work than it realistically could ever have handled.      
My focus has shifted in this section, from questions about how acts get sorted into 
the categories that a free speech theory defines, to the question of what categories 
a free speech theory should seek to define in the first place. It may seem that the 
Subtractive Approach and its alleged defects have dropped out of the analysis. 
But that’s not quite right. Consider an analogy. Suppose we’re trying to map out 
a binary taxonomy, distinguishing the living things that are ANIMALS from the 
ones that aren’t. Given this kind of binary sorting task, it makes good sense to ask 
whether an Additive or Subtractive method is going to do a better job at correctly 
classifying the entities in question. But if we’re trying to taxonomically sort living 
things into multiple classes – FISH, MAMMALS, INSECTS, BIRDS, etc. – then an Ad-
ditive definitional method would clearly strike us as the better approach from the 
outset. We could, as per the Subtractive Approach, classify all living things as FISH 
by default, and then specify criteria that identify living things as non-FISH, so as 
to subtract them from that class, before repeating this method for each category 
in turn. But that would be an absurdly convoluted way to carry out the task. The 
more efficient and reliable method would obviously just be to specify what makes 
something a FISH, and then add things into that taxonomical class if they satisfy 
                                                     
82 To see that something like PROTEST is not merely a relabeled version of our original SPEECH category, 
we need only note how dissimilar to ‘speech’ much of what merits protection qua PROTEST is. Setting fire 
to an object – a flag, an effigy, or a bra – can all be acts of protest. Conspicuous and defiant silence – that 
is literal silence: refusing to speak when called upon to do so – can function as protest under certain cir-
cumstances; see Louis Michael Seidman, Silence and Freedom (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). 
All of these acts should be accorded special protection against coercive government interference. But this 
is not because they are ‘SPEECH’. Rather, it’s because they are instances of a type of activity, PROTEST, 
which may or may not be performed via the use of linguistic tokens, but which, so the Democratic ARGU-
MENTS indicate, we have good reasons to specially immunize against government restriction irrespective 
of their linguistic or non-linguistic character. 
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these criteria. A Subtractive Approach to a definitional problem only looks like a 
viable methodology when the definitional problem is a binary sorting task. The 
point, then, is that if we favor – or uncritically accept – a Subtractive Approach 
to defining categories of specially protected communicative conduct, we are 
prematurely rejecting a Subdividing Approach to free speech theory. In short, an 
account of the problems that come with a Subtractive Approach to defining 
SPEECH is not merely a way of setting the stage for consideration of an unortho-
dox, subdivided conception of free speech theory; it’s more like a necessary pre-
requisite for our envisioning this alternative. 
11. The alleged prudence of casting a wide net 
In §10 I said nothing about ARGUMENTS from Government, which treat the in-
competence or mendacity of governments as a key justificatory basis for free 
speech. Rather than training our focus on any particular species of communica-
tive action (e.g., the way Epistemic ARGUMENTS train our focus on inquiry-ori-
ented communications, like scholarly research), ARGUMENTS from Government 
express general skepticism about the capacity of governments to regulate any 
communicative conduct in a way that competently and impartially furthers only 
legitimate ends. Such ARGUMENTS are grounded in what Joshua Cohen calls ‘the 
Unhappy Facts of Life’, chief among which is that people who acquire political 
power tend to be (and/or become) vain, biased, corrupt, prone to inflating the 
dangers of the ideas they object to, and so on.83 Cohen’s worries are eminently 
reasonable, and moreover, they are unmistakably an important thematic touch-
stone in the free speech tradition. Note, however, that a generalized mistrust of 
government, in view of the Unhappy Facts of Life, is also a crucial part of what 
recommends liberalism per se, with its aversion to states being governed by a sub-
stantive conception of the good, over the more overtly moralized (and thus, more 
corruptibly parochial) political views on offer in the Communitarian region of the 
political landscape. If the Unhappy Facts are to underwrite any distinct princi-
ples of communicative liberty, beyond axiomatic liberal precepts (like the non-reg-
ulation of harmless or self-affecting action), then we need some reason to think 
that these Unhappy Facts are liable to produce more error, or greater corruption, 
in a government’s attempts to restrict certain specific communicative activities, 
than in its attempts to restrict other kinds of behavior.84 
                                                     
83 Cohen, supra note 13 at 233. 
84 A different strategy for trying to mitigate the perils of the Unhappy Facts would be to focus on con-
straining government’s power to enact legislation of any kind – regardless of whether it suppresses 
SPEECH – if and when that legislation’s purpose is the suppression of disapproved viewpoints; see Eric 
Barendt, Freedom of Speech, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 78-83. But this doesn’t obvi-
ate the need to specify the acts for which special communicative liberties apply, since there will still be a 
range of cases in which, even if the government’s overt purpose isn’t to suppress a particular viewpoint, 
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In short, there is a burden of specification, for those whose free speech theory 
supposedly rests on ARGUMENTS from Government, to say precisely which com-
municative acts occasion an additional level of disquiet about government incom-
petence or mendacity, so as to activate the supplementary normative apparatus 
of ‘free speech’. And this brings us right back to square one. The claim cannot just 
be that the restriction of ‘speech’, in the everyday sense, is what triggers a height-
ened level of disquiet, because there are so many kinds of ‘speech’ that evidently 
bear no relation to the types of communicative acts that are adverted to, in the 
ARGUMENTS, as exemplars or embodiments of distinctive benefits or dangers. If 
ARGUMENTS from Government tell us anything about the class of behaviors whose 
restriction activates this supplementary normative apparatus, it is only that some 
such class exists and demands our attention. In order to progress beyond this 
point, we need to do precisely what I’ve been proposing: analyze the ARGUMENTS 
in the free speech tradition in order to identify the types of communicative acts 
they nominate for special treatment. What we see, then, is that there are several 
distinct types of communicative acts that are at issue, not some capacious um-
brella class of things called ‘SPEECH’. 
Someone might argue that we need to retain the umbrella class of SPEECH as a 
diagnostic category in free speech theory, by again expressing anxiety about the 
perils of under-protection. Greenawalt for one gestures in this direction. If we 
doubt our ability to accurately nominate the types of communicative action that 
require special protection, he suggests, then we actually have reason to welcome 
the fuzzy boundaries that come with talk of SPEECH per se, since they serve to cast 
a wide net of protection over communications of all varieties. Greenawalt says 
that 
Sensitive legislators could believe that even their ability to perceive the reach 
of the justifications for free speech is tainted and that they should accord pro-
tection to forms of communication even when they are dubious that the jus-
tifications for protection are relevant. This view would be reinforced if the 
legislators thought that a mistaken suppression of speech was a much worse 
wrong than a failure to adopt a desirable prohibition of communicative activ-
ities.85  
There are three things to say on behalf of a Subdividing Approach to free speech 
in reply to this line of defense for an overarching SPEECH classification. (i) This 
defense ultimately concedes the main point of contention. Using an over-general, 
equivocally-labelled classification (i.e. SPEECH) to structure the policy system 
that protects special communicative liberties, ensures that some communicative 
acts that don’t merit special protection are accorded it nonetheless. Against this 
                                                     
its actions will nevertheless have that effect, and where we thus need to decide whether what’s being 
suppressed falls under a principle of communicative liberty, such that the government action has to sat-
isfy a more stringent justificatory standard.  
85 Greenawalt, supra note 43 at 41. 
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bias in favor of overprotection, a Subdividing Approach seeks neither to overpro-
tect nor under-protect, but rather to protect all and only the communicative acts 
that really do, by the lights of the ARGUMENTS, merit special protection. (ii) To 
favor overprotection for communication in spite of this, is to engage in a kind of 
Libertarian ‘double-counting’, the upshot of which is that governments will be 
obstructed in their efforts to police some genuinely harmful communicative acts, 
acts which aren’t identified in any ARGUMENT as meriting the protections that 
underpin the obstruction, but which are protected solely because they get slotted 
into a nebulous classification and caught up in the wide net that it casts. As I said 
in §8, the theorist who, in principle, prefers deliberate overprotection to attempts 
at accurate protection is either ignoring the real dangers of overprotection, or ex-
aggerating the perils of under-protection. (iii) It may be that the integrity of a 
legal regime at a particular place and time becomes so badly degraded that, in 
order to guard against unchecked tyranny, it’s prudent to beef-up our constraints 
on the government’s ability to restrict people’s conduct. But if this is what justi-
fies SPEECH’s wide net, then there’s no reason to limit ourselves to overprotecting 
communicative acts as distinct from other kinds of activity. Once we abandon the 
project of seeking to specially protect all and only those things that really do merit 
special protection, and instead aim to specially protect all the things that actually 
merit special protection, plus some fuzzily-defined penumbra of other superfi-
cially similar things, no principled reasons can be invoked in order to set bound-
aries around that penumbra. 
I don’t mean to deny the appropriateness of the pessimism about government ac-
tion that animates ARGUMENTS from Government. One need only revisit the 
U.S.’s “long and unfortunate history of overreacting to the dangers of wartime”, 
to see how rapidly a regime of expressive liberty can crumble – even a regime 
which expressly glorifies this liberty – when placed under significant pressure.86 
However, it is precisely because we want to formulate political systems which 
guard against these Unhappy Facts that we situate our theorizing in the liberal 
tradition in the first place, and recognize the need for further protections, beyond 
those already baked into a liberal harm principle, for certain kinds of communi-
cative acts. It is clumsy and artificial (not to mention neurotic) to attempt to 
structurally encode Libertarian biases into every classificatory element of the 
principles we’re formulating. If a theorist were really that pessimistic about the 
government’s ability to implement a principled legal framework as its architects 
envisioned, then regime-designing projects would be futile by that theorist’s own 
lights anyway.87 
                                                     
86 Geoffrey R Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime; From the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on Terrorism 
(New York: WW Norton & Company, 2004). 
87 This isn’t to say that liberals should just give up on trying to constrain tyranny, but rather to stress that 
de jure legal safeguards ultimately can’t achieve this alone. As Stone says, to resist a slide towards tyranny 
during a crisis “a nation needs not only legal protection of civil liberties but a culture of civil liberties… an 
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12. Freedom of speech acts 
How do the definitional and categorizational issues that I’ve been discussing con-
nect up with larger questions in free speech theory? There are plenty who dislike 
what they see when they look at free speech theory, because of how typical un-
derstandings of free speech allow that certain racist or sexist practices can qualify 
as SPEECH, thus forcing arguments for their legal regulation to satisfy more oner-
ous justificatory standards. Some theorists, like Fish (see §4), present such criti-
cisms on behalf of a wholesale rejection of free speech theory. Others – like Maitra 
and McGowan (see §§5-6) – attempt to redraw the boundaries of SPEECH in a way 
which shows that, on principled grounds, some of the problematic communica-
tions usually taken to sit inside SPEECH’s protective sphere can in fact be relo-
cated outside of it. Both strategies aim, in different ways, to chisel away at the 
aggrandized status that’s ascribed to free speech by many who write about it, es-
pecially those First Amendment theorists who are eager to wax pious about 
American Constitutional Exceptionalism. I have reservations about this chisel-
ing, however, because I believe the ‘Exceptionalists’ are at least half-right. The 
understanding of free speech that’s prevalent in U.S. Constitutional jurispru-
dence has a radical and progressive idea at its center: that constituencies who at-
tain political power should ostensibly be banned from policing the key communi-
cative activities of their opponents, and the relevant forms of communication 
should be accorded an immunity from government interference that is in some 
genuine sense categorical. In view of the Unhappy Facts noted in §11 – the corrupt-
ing influence that political power has upon those who wield it, the gross immis-
erations inflicted by the censorship regimes that have arisen in many political 
communities – this categorical approach to free speech has the potential, so the 
Exceptionalists say (rightly, I believe), to underwrite a genuinely emancipatory 
politics. But this radical and progressive idea generates problems of its own if it 
is manipulated so as to extend special immunities to types of communication that 
have no genuine claim to this privilege, and which are merely swept into an over-
broad protective net. Is there a way to remain vigilant in protecting the commu-
nication that really needs to be kept safe against the repressive urges of the polit-
ically powerful – research, journalism, political debate, satire, protest, ethical and 
religious discourse, art, and literature – without unduly fettering the state’s 
power to enact its legitimate purposes in regulating harmful instances of other 
forms of communication that don’t merit the same privileged status? My project 
here – overturning the Subtractive Approach to defining SPEECH, and offering a 
subdivided reconceptualization of our categories of special communicative lib-
erty – is an attempt to move free speech theory in this direction. 
When one attempts to subtract things like hate speech from the domain of 
SPEECH, while operating within a conventionally-structured free speech system, 
                                                     
environment in which citizens are more informed, open-minded, skeptical, critical of their political lead-
ers, tolerant of dissent, and protective of the freedom of all individuals”; Ibid at 537. 
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the tendency is to reinscribe the longstanding misapprehension, that the things 
meriting protection as SPEECH are mere sayings, whereas verbal acts that don’t 
merit protection as SPEECH are more like doings. This warps the substance of the 
ARGUMENTS that supply free speech theory with its underlying normative force. 
Democratic ARGUMENTS, for instance, when properly elucidated, don’t just call 
for protection for ‘expressions of opinion’, they demand protection for (among 
other things) militant political activism, disruptive satire, the setting-up of elec-
tion placards on one’s lawn, and various other kinds of actions. One further thing 
that bears emphasizing, then, vis-à-vis the motivations for the approach I’ve been 
developing, is the way that it chimes with one aspect of the revisionist free speech 
theorizing we find in contemporary feminist critiques of pornography. In defend-
ing Catharine MacKinnon’s provocative claim, that pornography silences women, 
Rae Langton and others argue that pornography effects a kind of ‘illocutionary 
disablement’, which is to say that it impairs the ability of women to perform cer-
tain illocutionary acts (i.e. to do things with words, like refusing a sexual ad-
vance) that they should be able to do, and otherwise would be able to do, but for 
pornography’s corrosive influence on the communicative environment. If this is 
right, there’s at least a prima facie case to be made for legally restricting pornogra-
phy; the state should (legally) silence the speech of pornographers, as a way of 
preventing them from (illocutionarily) silencing the speech of women attempting 
to verbally refuse a sexual advance.88 There’s plenty in this that’s contentious. Au-
thors who propound this line of argument reject one of the framing assumptions 
in most free speech theory (including here, see §2), namely, that free speech prin-
ciples are fundamentally about disallowing certain types of government action, 
and hence cannot underpin pro-censorship arguments.89 They also favor a con-
troversial view about how the social meanings and practices around sex operate, 
one that attributes a huge influence to pornography.90 The part of this feminist 
critique that chimes with my analysis here, though, is simply its forthright – and 
                                                     
88 See Rae Langton, “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts” (1993) 22:4 Philosophy & Public Affairs 293; 
Rae Langton & Caroline West, “Scorekeeping in a Pornographic Language Game” (1999) 77:3 Australa-
sian J Phil 303; Ishani Maitra, “Silencing Speech” (2009) 39:2 Can J Phil 309. The claims from MacKinnon 
appear at a number of points in her work, including supra note 63. Arguments to similar effect have also 
been made by critical race theorists defending the regulation of racist hate speech, e.g., Charles R Law-
rence, “Crossburning and the Sound of Silence: Antisubordination Theory and the First Amendment” 
(1992) 37:4 Vill L Rev 787. However, the speech-act-theoretic framework that’s integral in recent feminist 
philosophy on this issue hasn’t been widely used in critical race theory in this area. 
89 Under this analysis, free speech is understood as giving us positive reasons to restrict some kinds of 
communication, so as to enable or disinhibit other kinds of communication. Outside of the anti-pornog-
raphy literature, this approach to free speech has been defended by mainstream theorists of constitutional 
law; see, e.g., Owen M Fiss, The Irony of Free Speech (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); as well as 
by proponents of classical liberal political theory; see David O Brink, “Millian Principles, Freedom of Ex-
pression, and Hate Speech” (2001) 7:2 Leg Theory 119. 
90 For criticism of this analysis on both fronts see Daniel Jacobson, “Freedom of Speech Acts?” (1995) 24:1 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 64; Leslie Green, “Pornographizing, Subordinating, and Silencing” in Robert 
C Post, ed, Censorship and Silencing: Practices of Cultural Regulation (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute for 
the History of Art and the Humanities, 1998) 285. 
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by my lights correct and still underappreciated – insistence that free speech has 
to be about people’s freedom to perform important speech acts; not merely to say 
things, but rather to do important communicative things (including, but not lim-
ited to, expressing opinions) with their words. A Subdividing Approach to free 
speech, which replaces a principle of free speech per se with principles protecting 
Freedom of Art, Freedom of Protest, and so on, is geared to accommodate this 
understanding of what communicative liberties are really for. 
13. Conclusion: two kinds of ideal theory 
Free speech theory has to circumscribe the domain of activities to which it ap-
plies. Subtractive Approaches aim to do that, by identifying the communicative 
acts that don’t merit free speech’s special protections, and extracting them out 
from the protected category of SPEECH. Different strategies for making these sub-
tractions have been examined here, and in each case I’ve argued that Subtractive 
Approaches impede our attempts to define the protected class of communicative 
acts in a way that answers to the ARGUMENTS, that is to say, in a way that only 
extends special protection to the acts that really merit it. What follows from this, 
however, is not just that we should switch over to an additive definitional 
method, but that we should reconceive the categories of communicative liberty 
that structure free speech policy frameworks. In place of the umbrella classifica-
tion of SPEECH, we should recognize a plurality of narrower categories of pro-
tected communicative action, each of which corresponds with a particular family 
of free speech ARGUMENTS, and each of which is populated by only those com-
municative acts that are integrally involved in the social processes via which the 
values/ideals adverted to in the relevant ARGUMENTS are promoted or imperiled. 
The communicative acts that are elected to a privileged status, under this subdi-
vided system of communicative liberty, should still be accorded robust protection 
against legal restriction, just as proponents of free speech orthodoxy recommend. 
But these protections, under the system that I’m recommending, aren’t extended 
to anything that can be identified with a class of things as broad and nebulous as 
‘SPEECH’. Indeed, there’s ultimately no method for defining SPEECH that fares well 
by the ‘answering to the ARGUMENTS’ criterion, because the very postulation of 
some reified, overarching class of communicative acts already misrepresents what 
the ARGUMENTS establish. We should use an Additive Approach to define cate-
gories of protected communication, then, but this methodological shift should be 
packaged with a – pluralized, ramified – reconfiguration of the categories we’re 
trying to define.  
But to whom exactly are all these recommendations addressed? The reader may 
question whether it’s sufficiently realistic, on my part, to call for such a drastic 
renovation of the structure of free speech theory. I’ll finish by speaking to this 
worry. Ideal political theory involves proffering an account of the conditions of 
justice to be aimed at, whereas non-ideal theory consists in discussing what we 
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need to do in practice to promote those conditions, given present (unjust) reali-
ties.91 Free speech theorizing is customarily conducted in the ideal mode. Theo-
rists don’t devise political tactics aimed at realizing a just free speech system; they 
try to say what such a system would involve in the first place. This is especially 
evident when it comes to the justificatory grounds of free speech. Many values and 
ideals are threaded into free speech discourse, and while they aren’t all necessarily 
at loggerheads with each other, nor is it possible for them all simultaneously to 
be the normative cornerstone of free speech theory. One way to idealize in free 
speech theory, then, is by articulating an ethical or political vision of free speech 
which cuts through this disarray, and nominates one particular value or ideal as 
the normative cornerstone of free speech, advocating adjustments to free speech 
policy to bring it into alignment with that vision. Such idealizing isn’t merely tol-
erated in free speech theory, it’s generally welcomed. As Seana Shiffrin says, ar-
ticulating ethical foundations that are “independent of our actual historical tra-
dition is essential to allowing us to assess which aspects of our historical tradi-
tion are worth valorizing and which should be amended”, and it also “supplies the 
resources to engage in the… function of understanding our extant traditions in 
their best light”.92 Idealizing analyses of this kind are commonplace in the litera-
ture, regardless of the infeasibility of the recommendations they yield, and this is 
presumably because participants in the discourse think it’s a worthwhile enter-
prise to try to envisage a better form of free speech politics, without direct regard 
to the implementability of the policies that would emerge from it. Insofar as that’s 
the case, free speech theorists can hardly object, on grounds of infeasibility, to the 
kind of structurally idealizing free speech framework that I’m espousing here. 
Of course it would be difficult at best for a First Amendment analysis to subdivide 
its protected categories of communicative liberty, and do away with the overarch-
ing classification of SPEECH, given the centrality of the term ‘speech’ within that 
                                                     
91 These definitions are borrowed from Simmons, whose definitions are based in turn on Rawls’s (1971) 
original distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory; see A John Simmons, “Ideal and Nonideal Theory” 
(2010) 38:1 Philosophy & Public Affairs 5; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1971). 
There is another kind of idealizing methodological maneuver, which Rawls and some of his followers 
favor, which consists in positing principles of justice under the assumption that the agents governed by 
those principles will all fully accept and fully abide by them, i.e. the assumption of ‘strict compliance’. 
When I speak of ideal theory here I’m not meaning to refer to this kind of ‘strict compliance’ method. 
92 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, “Methodology in Free Speech Theory” (2011) 97:3 Va L Rev 549 at 550. Instead 
of positing ethical bases independent of First Amendment doctrine, to try to improve or clarify that doctrine, 
it’s at least as common an approach, among American legal theorists, to seek to discern the core values 
operative within First Amendment doctrine. On this issue I favor the position that has its roots in Mei-
klejohn, supra note 15, on which the ideal of participatory democracy – roughly: the opportunity to par-
ticipate in collective self-government – functions as the First Amendment’s normative core; I favor this 
position because I agree with Weinstein that, if any ideal can be ascribed a central position in this juris-
prudential tradition, participatory democracy “is the only contender that the case law does not massively 
contradict”; James Weinstein, “Participatory Democracy as the Basis of American Free Speech Doctrine: 
a Reply” (2011) 97:3 Va L Rev 633 at 643. But it is consistent with this to think that a broader set of ethical 
ideals ought to ground free speech policy, and that the First Amendment isn’t structurally conducive to 
implementing policies that answer to a broader set of ideals.     
41 
 
framework.93 It might be that the legal system which is best-placed to restructure 
its free speech policy in accordance with the Subdividing Approach is Australia’s. 
Unlike other similar liberal democracies, Australia has no constitutional or fed-
eral bill of rights, although political movements aimed at implementing an Aus-
tralian bill of rights have arisen repeatedly, and currently two states (the Austral-
ian Capital Territory and Victoria) have state human rights acts.94 If in future 
Australia were to implement a constitutional bill of rights with a system of judi-
cial review, there is no in-principle reason why this bill could not structure spe-
cial communicative liberties in Australia by enshrining multiple principles of 
communicative liberty – Freedom of Art, Freedom of Protest, Freedom of Inquiry, 
etc. – instead of one single overarching principle of Free Speech. It’s also worth 
noting, in this connection, that the Conservative government elected in the 
United Kingdom in 2015 has said it plans to replace the U.K.’s 1998 Human Rights 
Act (which brings the rights articulated in the European Convention on Human 
Rights into U.K. law) with a new British Bill of Rights.95 Free speech rights in the 
U.K. currently receive some measure of protection under the common law, and 
while a new British bill of rights wouldn’t have anything like the same degree of 
influence as the First Amendment in U.S. constitutional law (because of the Brit-
ish courts’ much more limited ability to alter parliamentary legislation), never-
theless a new British bill of rights could articulate and endorse a subdivided con-
ception of free speech, and thereby have a major effect on how free speech policy 
evolves in the U.K., via both parliamentary and judicial action. This is all specu-
lative, obviously. Whether and how a Subdividing Approach to free speech theory 
could be put into action in any real-world jurisdiction any time soon, is a question 
whose complexities cannot be adequately addressed in this paper. The point that 
I was making above, to reiterate, is that free speech theorizing routinely sets itself 
outside the legal institutions that it is speaking to, and proposes reforms that 
couldn’t be realized without an overhaul of the institutions in question. Restruc-
turing free speech theory in order to subdivide the category of SPEECH would be 
a major overhaul indeed, but that’s not a good reason to dismiss the case for this 
proposal. 
                                                     
93 Schauer has spoken of a “multi-valued theory” which treats “the free speech and free press clauses of 
the First Amendment as the umbrella under which are located a number of more or less distinct separate 
principles, each with its own justification, each directed towards a separate group of problems”; we 
might, he says “have several First Amendments”; Schauer, supra note 4 at 1303. Horwitz’s discussion of a 
multifaceted, institution-oriented approach to the First Amendment examines how something like this 
might be achievable within the institutional constraints of First American doctrine; see Paul Horwitz, 
First Amendment Institutions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013). Although there would be plenty 
of complications and difficulties in practice, subdividing free speech within a First Amendment frame-
work may still be possible. 
94 See Jeffrey Goldsworthy, “Introduction” in Tom Campbell, Jeffrey Goldsworthy, & Adrienne Stone, 
eds, Protecting Rights Without a Bill of Rights: Institutional Performance and Reform in Australia (Aldershot: Ash-
gate, 2006) 1.  
95 See The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015 at 60, online: <https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto>. 
